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PART II., 1900.
i r tules anbr CUnual Cases.
HYPNOTIC AND POST-HYPNOTIC APPEECIATION
OF TIME ; SECONDAEY AND MULTIPLEX
PERSONALITIES.
BY J. MILNE BRAMWELL, M.B., CM.
I COMMENCED to employ hypnotism as a therapeutic
agent in 1889, and in less than two years treated over 500
patients; of these 48 per cent, became somnambules, i.e.,
were unable when hypnosis terminated to recall the events
of hypnotic life. Having pbserved that the curative effect
of suggestion was increased by prolonged hypnosis, I fre-
quently suggested to my patients that they were to remain
in that state until a given hour—usually that of their next
meal—and then left them. Although rarely present at the
conclusion of the experiment, I obtained ample and trust-
worthy evidence that hypnosis invariably terminated at, or
within a few minutes of, the hour indicated, and thus acci-
dentally discovered that deep hypnosis was associated with
an increased appreciation of time. These observations—the
by-product of therapeutic work—led to more careful experi-
ment with somnambules, the majority of whom were males
and all in good health. The following were the usual
suggestions given : (1) A simple act was suggested during
hypnosis which was to be carried out at a given time
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162 ORIGINAL ARTICLES AND CLINICAL CASES
before that state terminated. (2) The subject was told
during hypnosis that this state was to terminate at a
specified future hour. (3) The performance of a simple
act at a given hour after the termination of hypnosis was
suggested. (4) Awakening from natural sleep at a given
hour was suggested during hypnosis. (5) The subject
was told in the waking state that he was to pass into the
hypnotic condition at a given hour, remain hypnotised
for a specified length of time and perform certain simple
acts at stated intervals; then pass again into the normal
state and remain in it for a specified time, and again pass
into the hypnotic condition. These experiments, continued
from 1889 to the present date, have been frequently repeated
before competent observers. The majority of the sugges-
tions were executed at the moment indicated, while in the
remainder the error in time appreciation rarely exceeded five
minutes. In every instance, except those referred to in
group No. 4, the subjects were carefully watched from the
beginning to the end of the experiment.
Similar phenomena have been observed by nearly all who
have done practical hypnotic work, and I have seen experi-
ments resembling those just cited reproduced in various
foreign cliniques. Two, formerly regarded as the most
remarkable of their kind, were made by Beaunis and
Liegeois. In one of these a visual hallucination appeared
after a suggested interval of 172 days, and in the other after
365. The late Professor Delboeuf, however, pointed out in
reference to all such experiments that even in the longest
a fixed date had been impressed upon the subject's mind.
Thus, Beaunis' subject was told that the 172nd day was
New Year's Day, and Liegeois' was impressed by the
fact that the suggestion was to be executed in a year
from the time it was given. The experiments, therefore,
did not involve the carrying out of a suggestion after
the lapse of so many days, which the subjects were sup-
posed to count as they passed, but simply on the arrival of
a fixed and easily recognised date. This objection applies
with great force to my earlier cases. In every instance a
specified hour was suggested ; and, in order that the subjects
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might be conveniently watched, the time involved rarely
exceeded a few hours. This point will be again referred to
in treating of the theoretical explanation of the appreciation
of time. Meanwhile, I wish to draw attention to the ex-
periments made by Delboeuf with the object of eliminating
an easily recognised fixed date from the suggestions.
DELBCEUF'S EXPERIMENTS.
These occupied a week, from Saturday, October 2, to Saturday,
October 9, 1886. His subjects were his two maid-servants, J-
and M., sisters, aged respectively 20 and 23. All the experi-
ments were of a similar character; from time to time during
hypnosis the subjects were told that they were to do something
at the expiration of a certain number of minutes, an interval of
waking life always intervening between the suggestion and its
fulfilment:—
Exp* 1.—Sat., Oct. 2, 1886; subject J . ; time 6 a.m. Sug.:
At the expiration of 350 m. J. was to ask Delboeuf if she should
harness the donkey. Delboeuf's wife was ill and went out in an
invalid carriage drawn by a donkey, but J. had nothing to do
with i t ; thus her question would be unusual. Bes.: The
impulse to ask the question came into J.'s mind at the time it
was due, but she successfully resisted it.
Exp. 2.—Subject M.; time 8 a.m. Sug. : At the expiration
of 350 m. M. was to ask Madame Delboeuf if she would like to
go out. Under the circumstances the question would be an
unusual one. Bes.: At 1.50, the hour indicated, M. was impelled
to ask the question, but as she happened to be in the village on
an errand, was unable to do so. She returned at 2.30 and
carried out the suggestion.
Exp. 3.—Mon.; subject J . ; time 9.15 a.m. Sug.: In 900 m.,
i.e., at 12.15 a.m., J. was to go into the bedroom of one of
Delboeuf's children and pull his ear. Bes.: Suggestion carried
out 95 m. too soon.
Exp. 4.—Subject M.; time 9.25 a.m. Sug.: M. was to
embrace Mile. H. Delboeuf at the expiration of 700 m. Bes. :
Twenty-five m. before the suggestion fell due M. looked for Mile.
H. Delbceuf in order to embrace her, but could not find her.
* Exp. = Experiment. Sug. = Suggestion. Res. = Result, d. = days,
h. = hours, m. = minutes.
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Exp. 5.—Subject M.; time 10.4 p.m. Sug.: In 900 m. M.
was to embrace Mile. C. Delbceuf. Bes.: At the time indicated,
i.e., 1.4 on Tuesday afternoon, M, was having her lunch with
the other servants when she suddenly got up from the table,
sought and found Mile. C. Delbceuf and carried out the
suggestion.
Exp. 6.—Tues.; subject J . ; time 6.30 a.m. Sug.: At the
expiration of 1,600 m. J. was to pull the cook's nose. Bes. :
Suggestion carried out 60 m. too soon.
Exp. 7.—Subject M.; time 6.45 a.m. Sug. : At the expira-
tion of 1,150 m. (Wed., 1.55 a.m.) she was to go into the cook's
bedroom and pull her by the ear. (The cook was told what was
likely to happen.) Bes.: At the exact hour the subject had a
strong impulse to carry out the experiment, but resisted this
until 4.15 a.m., when she gave in and went to the cook's room.
The cook laughed, whereupon M. said: "If you laugh I shall
pull your ear."
Exp. 8.—Wed.; subject J . ; time 9.55 a.m. Sug. : At the
expiration of 1,300 m. (Th., 7.35 a.m.) J. was to ask Madame
Delbceuf if she would like to have her hair dressed. Bes. :
Suggestion carried out 69 m. too soon.
Exp. 9.—Subject M.; time 6.55 a.m. Sug.: At the expira-
tion of 1,500 m. (Th., 7.55 a.m.) M. was to ask Madame Delbceuf
i£ she required anything. Bes. : Suggestion carried out with
absolute accuracy.
Exp. 10.—Friday; subject M.; time 6.30 a.m. Sug.: M.
was to feel sleepy at 10 p.m.; go to bed and sleep profoundly.
Bes.: Correct.
Exp. 11.—Subject J . ; time 9.15 a.m. Sug.: At 11 p.m. J.
was to go into M.'s room and give her a complicated sugges-
tion to be carried out at 5.30 next morning. Bes. : J. went
to bed at 10 p.m. in her own room and quickly fell asleep.
At 10.50 p.m. (10 minutes too early) she went to her sister as
suggested, but could not afterwards recall what she had said
or done.
Exp. 12.—Subject M. Stig.: M. was to execute the orders
just referred to at 5.30 a.m. She did nothing, however, beyond
carrying out the first part of the suggestion, i.e., that she should
go to bed and sleep profoundly, and was unable to remember
whether her sister had said anything to her or not.
Exp. 13.—Sat.; subject J . ; time 9.30 a.m. Sug. : At the
expiration of 3,300 m. J. was to ask Delbceuf if she should carry
a small ladder to the pear tree. Bes.: The impulse to ask the
question arose 90 m. too late, but J. did not give way to it.
 by guest on June 7, 2016
http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
HYPNOTIC AND POST-HYPNOTIC APPRECIATION OF TIME 165
Exp. 14.—Subject M.; time 10 a.m. Sug.: Similar to the
last to be executed after a like interval. Res.: Identical with
the above, but 90 minutes too soon.
Summary.
There were in all fourteen experiments. The suggestions, to
be carried out after the lapse of 350, 900, 1,600, 1,150, 1,300 and
3,300 minutes respectively, were made at varying hours of the
day and night, while some fell due at night after the lapse of
several days.
Results.
Three of the suggestions were fulfilled at the moment they
fell due; four were carried out, but not at the exact time. In
three an impulse to carry out the suggestion arose at the right
moment. In one of these, the subject successfully resisted the
suggestion, in another, she was accidentally prevented from exe-
cuting it, while in the third, she struggled against it for two
hours and twenty minutes and then carried it out. In three, the
impulse to carry out the suggestion arose, but not at the correct
time. In one of these cases accidental circumstances alone pre-
vented the suggestion from being carried out, but in the two
others, the subject successfully resisted it. One alone, No. 12,
failed completely, but this may have been due to the fact that
No. 11 was not fulfilled in its entirety, i.e., it is doubtful whether
J. gave the requisite orders to M. As, however, the essential
fact in the experiments was not the actual carrying out of trivial
and sometimes absurd suggestions, but the patient's recognition
of the terminal time, the cases in which an impulse arose at the
correct moment must be classed amongst the successes. The
number of these is thus raised to six, while of the eight remain-
ing experiments seven were partially successful. Of the latter
four were carried out and an impulse to execute the suggestion
arose in the other three, but in none was the time accurate ; the
error varied from a tenth to a thirty-seventh of the interval.
Remarks.
J. and M. were strong healthy peasant girls, who had
frequently been hypnotised and were both good somnambules.
At an earlier date, Delbceuf had made the following experiment
with J. After explaining what he proposed to do, and obtaining
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166 ORIGINAL ARTICLES AND CLINICAL CASES
her consent in the waking state, he hypnotised her, extended her
arms on a table, and suggested that the right should be insensible
to pain. Each arm was then burnt with a red-hot bar of iron,
8 millimetres in diameter, the extent and duration of its applica-
tion being identical in both, but there was pain in the left arm
alone. The burns were bandaged and J. sent to bed. During
the night the pain in the left arm continued, and next morning
there was a wound on it, 3 centimetres in diameter, with an odter
circle of inflamed blisters. On the rights there was only a defined
eschar, the exact size of the iron and without inflammation or
redness. The day following the left arm was still more painful
and inflamed; analgesia was then successfully suggested, when
the wound soon dried and the inflammation disappeared.
Later J. married and was 29 years of age when her first
child was born. She was attended by Dr. Fraipont, Lecturer of
Gynaecology at the University of Liege, while Delbceuf induced
hypnosis and made suggestions of analgesia. When J. was
aroused from the hypnotic state, after the birth of the child, she
was unable to recall anything that had occurred.
J. and M. were very imperfectly educated and could with
difficulty tell the time by the clock. It was impossible for them
to at once reduce such a large number of minutes as 400 into
hours and they were obliged to proceed by successive additions,
thus :—1 h o u r = 60 minutes; 1 hour and 1 hour makes 60 + 60 =
120 ; 120 + another hour makes 180, and so on. Before reaching
360 they had often made mistakes, and, no matter what method
they adopted, were absolutely incapable of reducing such numbers
as 1,600 and 1,150 minutes into hours. Further, supposing they
recalled the suggestion on the termination of hypnosis and noted
what o'clock it was—which they neither did nor could do—they
would still, for example, have to determine by mental calculation
the hour which corresponded to 6.45 p.m., increased by 1,150
minutes, a feat entirely beyond their powers.
Later, in order to discover whether J.'s hypnotic arithmetical
powers exceeded her normal ones, Delboeuf put the following
problems to her during hypnosis:—(1) "Turn 350 minutes into
hours." Answer: "Six hours. No, five and a half hours."
(2) " Turn 1,200 minutes into hours." A. " Fifteen hours. No,
twelve and a half hours." (3) "Turn 150 minutes into hours."
A. " Two and a half hours." (4) " Turn 240 minutes into hours."
A. "Two hours." "Th ink!" Answer, after two minutes,
" Four hours." (5) " Turn 300 minutes into hours." Answer,
after five seconds' calculation, " Four and a half hours." Then,
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after a further calculation, "Five and a half hours." Finally,
" Five and three quarter hours." Delbceuf asked J. to explain
the last calculation to him. She replied : " This makes five and
a half hours plus 3 times 10, which makes five and a half hours
exactly." Delboeuf tried to help J. as follows :—" How much is
60 + 60?" Answer, "120 minutes." "120 + 60?" A. " 180
minutes." "180 + 60?" Answer, after a long hesitation, " 240
minutes." " 240 + 60?" A. " 290 minutes." J. had spent ten
minutes over attempting to solve the last problem and showed
great signs of fatigue. Delboeuf did not consider it necessary to
push the questions further. It is to be noted that M. was a
somewhat better arithmetician than J., and that, in the experi-
ments referred to, her results were more accurate than J.'s.
FURTHER TIME EXPERIMENTS.
The following were inspired by Delboeuf's, and the
results were so remarkable that I feel justified in giving as
many details as possible, in order to present a fairly com-
plete picture of the subject of the experiments, and of the
circumstances under which they were carried out:—
Miss A., aged 19, was sent to me by Dr. de Watteville for
hypnotic treatment, on Sept. 2, 1895. Her health had been good
up to twelve months previously, when violent muscular tremor
of the right arm and hand commenced. After a few weeks this
spread to the right leg, and then to the left arm and leg; the
tremor ceased during sleep, but only then, while walking was
always difficult and painful. There was almost constant diffused
headache. During the last four months, there had been frequent
attacks of pain in the region of the heart. After the patient had
looked at a bright object—especially anything blue—everything
else appeared of that colour; this impression persisted for
about an hour, while its disappearance was always sudden and
accompanied by a feeling of faintness. Menstruation began at
11, and was always painful, and there had been obstinate con-
stipation from infancy. Her illness began after over-exertion and
mental strain, the result of nursing a relative who died. There
had been no previous hysterical symptoms and the family history
was good.
Treatment.—Electricity, massage, careful drugging and change
of air.
Result.—No improvement.
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168 ORIGINAL AKTTCLES AND CLINICAL CASES
I succeeded in inducing fairly deep hypnosis at the first
attempt; and this was repeated on September 4, 5, and 6, when
the tremor almost entirely disappeared. From then to October 30
she was hypnotised on seven occasions. Bes. : No tremor or
other morbid symptoms. Bowels regular. Last period free from
pain. Fourteen pounds gained in weight since beginning of treat-
ment. No abnormal colour perceptions. Returned to work.
Remarks.—Hypnosis became more profound each time it was
induced, and at the seventh seance Miss A. reached the stage of
somnambulism, i.e., she was unable in the normal state to recall
the events of hypnotic life. From this date she could at once
be made analgesic or anaesthetic by suggestion; touching the
cornea or tickling the back of the throat with a feather produced
no reflex, and the passing of a needle deeply into the flesh was
unattended by pain.
During treatment suggestions had been made fixing the hour
at which Miss A. was to fall asleep at night and the moment at
which she was to -wake in the morning. As these were remark-
ably successful, it occurred to me that she might prove a good
subject for experiments similar to those of Delboeuf. Miss A.
was an intelligent girl who had received an ordinary School-
board education, and her arithmetical powers were in keeping
with this ; she could do ordinary sums in multiplication and sub-
traction with the aid of a pencil and paper, but failed, unless
they were extremely simple, to solve them mentally. Notwith-
standing this, she asserted that she had been the best in her
class at mental arithmetic. She possessed no particular aptitude
for appreciating the passage of time.
Exp. 1.—Nov. 5, 1895 ; time 4 p.m. Suggestion given during
hypnosis: At the expiration of 5 h. and 20 m. Miss A. was to
make a cross on a piece of paper, and write down the time she
believed it to be without looking at clock or watch.—Bes.: The
suggestion was carried out the minute it fell due. Bemarks :
On this occasion I did not say anything to Miss A. about the
experiment, either before or after hypnosis, and, being a somnam-
bule, she retained in her waking consciousness no recollection of
the suggestion. I told her mother its nature, but not the time at
which it should be fulfilled. At 9.15 the same evening her mother
noticed that Miss A. was restless, and asked her what was the
matter. She replied, " I feel I must do something, but cannot
tell what." At 9.20 p.m. she rapidly made a cross with a pencil
and wrote " 20 minutes past 9 " on a piece of paper, at the same
time saying, "I t ' s all silliness." There was no clock in the
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room, but her mother went into the next room where there was
one, and found that the time was 9.20. When I again saw Miss
A., I explained the nature of the experiments I proposed making,
and instructed her to carry a pencil and paper during the day and
to put them by her bedside at night. I did not describe the experi-
ments as anything extraordinary, but simply told her that hypno-
tised subjects were often able to appreciate time, and that I
wished to see whether she could do so. No pecuniary or other
reward was promised or given. I told her I should make these
suggestions from time to time, but not on each occasion she
visited me. I neither told her in the waking condition that sug-
gestions had been made, nor informed her relatives when I made
them, nor what they were. They knew that suggestions of this
nature were given frequently, but only became acquainted with
them by seeing Miss A. carry them out, or by hearing from her
that she had done so. Before making the suggestions, I wrote
them down in my case book, and, when Miss A. again visited me,
I copied into it what she had written on the different pieces of
paper. In many instances I did not calculate when the sugges-
tions fell due, and in others the calculations I made at the time
were proved to be erroneous, the results of the experiments
in these cases being only determined when the series was
completed.
The experiments which followed were all of the same character,
i.e., during hypnosis Miss A. was told that, at the expiration of a
certain number of minutes, she was to make a cross and write
down the hour she believed it to be without consulting the clock,
an interval of waking life always intervening between the sugges-
tion and its fulfilment. The simple and uniform character of my
experiments is due to the fact that Delbceuf's subjects resisted
suggestions that were distasteful to them. The idea of making a
cross on apiece of paper excited no opposition in Miss A.'s mind,
while the fact that she recorded in writing the time at which the
suggestion was fulfilled, especially when this was witnessed by
others, put me in possession of evidence of a certain value. The
arithmetical problems involved in the first one or two of the fol-
lowing experiments were comparatively simple. In No. 3, for
example, as Miss A. could easily tell when 24 hours fell due, the
suggestion practically resolved itself into one to be fulfilled in
100 minutes. Soon, however, the experiments became compli-
cated and involved much more difficult problems in arithmetic.
Exp. 2.—Nov. 28, 1895 ; 2 p.m. Sug.: to be fulfilled in 320
m. Res. : Correct. Remarks: The suggestion was carried out
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at 7.20 p.m. when the patient was in a friend's house. She had
no watch with her and the clock in the room was wrong.
Exp. 3.—Dec.4 ; 3.15 p.m. Sug.: in 24 h. and 100 m. Res.:
Correct. Remarks: When in a friend's house the following
afternoon she carried out the suggestion at 4.55. She then asked
the time. Her friend looked at her watch and told her, where-
upon she remarked, " Your watch is 3 minutes fast." This was
the case.
Exp. 4.—Dec. 12; 3.20 p.m. Sug. : in24h. 1,440 m. Res. :
3.20 p.m. Sat., Dec. 14 : Correct.
Exp. 5.—Wed., Dec. 18; 3.45 p.m. Sug. : in 24 h. 2,880 m.
Res.: 3.45 p.m., Sat., Dec. 21 : Correct.
Exp. 6.-— Tues., Dec. 24 ; 2.55 p.m. Sug. : in 30 h. 50 m.
Res. : 9.45 p.m., Wed., Dec. 25 : Correct.
Exp. 7.—Tues., Dec. 24; 3.10 p.m. Sug. : in 7,200 m.
Res. : 3.10 p.m. Sun., Dec. 29 ; Correct. Remarks : When No.
7 was fulfilled the patient was teaching a Sunday school class,
when she suddenly felt an impulse to make a cross and mark the
time. It was only after doing so that she looked at the clock,
which was behind her.
Exp. 8.-—Tues., Dec. 3 1 ; 3.45 p.m. Sug. : in 4,335 m.
Res. : 4 p.m. Pri., Jan. 3, 1896 : Correct.
Exp. 9.—Dec, 31, 1895 ; 4 p.m. Sug. : in 11,525 m. Res. :
11.5 a.m., Wed., Jan. 8 : Wrong. Remarks : The result ought
to have been 4.5 p.m., Jan. 8. I re-hypnotised Miss A. on that
day and asked her to recall the suggestion I had made on Dec.
31. She said it was to be executed in 11,225 m.; it is possible
that I had made a mistake, but not at all likely, as I read the
suggestion to her with the figures before my eyes. The supposed
suggestion of 11,225 m. had been carried out correctly.
I now attempted to find out during hypnosis the patient's
mental condition in reference to these suggestions. In reply to
my questions she informed me :—(1) That when the suggestions
were made in hypnosis she did not calculate when they fell due ;
(2) That she did not calculate them at any time afterwards
during hypnosis. (3) That she had no recollection of them when
hypnosis terminated. (4) That no memory of them ever after-
wards arose in the waking state. (5) That shortly before their
fulfilment she always experienced a motor impulse, i.e., her
fingers moved as if to grasp a pencil and to perform the act of
writing. (6) That this impulse was immediately followed by the
idea of making a cross and writing certain figures. (7) That she
never looked at clock or watch until after she had made her
record.
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Experiments, Wed., Jan. 8, 1896.—No. 10 : 4.5 p.m. Sug. :
in 4,417 m.—No. 11 : 4.5 p.m. Sug. : in 11,470 m.—No. 12 :
4.30 p.m. Sug.: in 10,070 m.
As Miss A. stated in hypnosis that she made no calculations, in
order to vary the experiments I asked her, as soon as I made the
suggestions arid before terminating the hypnosis, to calculate
when they would fall due and tell me the result. She replied as
follows: No. 10, in 3 d. 37 m., or 23 m. to 5 next Saturday
afternoon.—No. 11, in 187 h. 50 m., or 7 d. 9 h. 50 m. Next
Wednesday morning at 5 m. to 12.—No. 12, in 1,067 h. 40 m., or
6 d. 23 h. and 40 m. 4.20 p m. next Wednesday.
Miss A.'s calculation in No. 10 was 1 h. 5 m. too early. The
interval (which was 1 h. too short) having apparently been calcu-
lated from 4 o'clock, instead of 4.5 p.m. In No. 11 her calcula-
tion was I d . 3 h. 20 m. too early. Here (1) 11,270 was taken
instead of 11,470, and hence the interval was calculated to be
187 h. 50 m., equalling 7 d. 19 h. 50 m. (2) 7 d. 9 h. 50 m. was
given instead of 7 d. 19 h. 50 m. The time falling due was then
calculated with this interval (7.19.50), but (3) a mistake of 1 d.
was made.
In No. 12 her result was correct, but did not correspond with
her calculation. 10,070 m. equals 167 h. 50 m., not 1,067 h.
40 m. Here (1) a cypher was wrongly inserted and (2) 40 m.
miscalculated for 50. The latter error was repeated when 6 d.
23 h. 40 m. was given instead of 6 d. 23 h. 50 m.—Res.: No. 10,
Sat., Jan. 11, 5.42 p.m.: Correct.—No. 11, Thur., Jan. 16, 3.15
p.m.: Correct.—No. 12, Wed., Jan. 15, 4.20 p.m. : Correct.
Remarks.
As the subject had wrongly calculated during hypnosis
the time the suggestions fell due, I concluded that she had
thus fixed these dates in her own mind and would carry out
the experiments in accordance with them. My astonish-
ment was great when they were executed correctly. I re-
hypnotised Miss A. and said to her, "You did not carry out
these suggestions at the hours you told me they would fall
due. Why was this ? " She replied, " What I told you was
all wrong." "How do you know the other results are right?"
" I can't tell you, I only feel that they are." Further ques-
tioning elicited no memory of the processes by which the
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original mistakes had been corrected. Miss A., assured me
that she had never thought of the suggestions from the time
they were made; she simply fulfilled them in response to an
impulse to write down the figures, and while doing so,
neither recalled her calculations nor even the suggestions
themselves.
When No. 12 was fulfilled, Miss A. had been hypnotised
in my room for an hour and had had no opportunity of con-
sulting the clock. Exactly at 4.20, without waking or open-
ing her eyes, she said she had to make a cross and put down
the time—this was preceded by the movement of the fingers
already described. From this date I arranged that some of
the experiments should fall due when Miss A. visited me,
but not, it is important to note, every time she came. They
were fulfilled either in the normal waking state or in hyp-
nosis, and Miss A. recorded them herself in my case book.
I then at once compared her figures with the actual time and
entered the result, this being nearly always witnessed and
signed by others. From this date several suggestions were
made at each seance. In some cases, the same hour was
given as the starting point of all the experiments; in others,
varying and even imaginary ones were chosen. In the
latter case, the subject was told the actual time, but ordered
to carry out the experiment from, say, 2.15 p.m. of the
previous day.
Experiments, Wed., Jan. 15, 4.45 p.m.—No. 13, from 4.45
p.m. Sug. : . in 4,453 m.—No. 14, from 2 p.m. Sug.: in
10,470 m.—No. 15, from 2 p.m. Sug.: in 10,060 m.
At the time the suggestions were made the patient was again
asked in hypnosis to calculate when they would fall due and
replied rapidly:—" No. 13, in 722 h. and 33 m., or 11.15 p.m.
next Wednesday." " No. 14, in 197 h. and" 30 m., or 4.5 p.m.
next Wednesday." " No. 15, in 8 d., 5 h. and 30 m., or 4.25
p.m. next Wednesday."
In No. 13, Miss A.'s calculation was 4 d. 4 h. 17 m. too late.
4,453 m. equals 74 h. 13 m., not 722 h. 33 m. Perhaps 4,453
was mistaken for 43,353 equalling 722 h., 33 m. The time of
falling due had been calculated from the interval of No. 14.
In No. 14, her calculation was 4 h. 25 m. too early. 10,470 m.
equals 174 h. 30 m., not 197 h. 30 m. The time of falling due
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was also wrong. There is no explanation for either of these
independent errors.
In No. 15, her calculation was 1 h. 45 m. too late. The
wrongly calculated interval, 8 d. 5 h. 30 m., corresponded to the
wrongly calculated 197 h. 30 m. of No. 14; this interval had
apparently remained in the mind. The time of falling due had
been calculated with 4.45 as initial time, as in No. 13, instead
of 3.0.
Results.—No. 13, Sat., Jan. 18, 6.58 p.m. Correct.—No. 14,
Wed., Jan. 22, 8.30 p.m. Correct.—No. 15, Wed., Jan. 22, 2.40
p.m. Correct.
Remarks.—Again the subject's miscalculation did not affect
the accuracy of her results, and questioning in hypnosis again
failed to revive any memory of the processes by which these had
been reached.
Experiments, Wed., Jan. 22, 4.5 p.m.—No. 16. Sug. : in
20,180 m.—No. 17. Sug.: in 20,160 m.—No. 18. Sug.: in
20,140 m. Miss A.'s calculations in hypnosis. "No. 16, in
336 h. 20 m., or 13 d. 20 m. Tues., Feb. 4, at 4.25 p.m."
" No. 17, Tues., Feb. 4, at 4.5 p.m." " No. 18, Tues., Feb. 4, at
3.45 p.m." In each instance these calculations were 1 d. too
early, but in No. 16, 20,180 m. was correctly given as 336 h. 20 m.
Results.— No. 16, Feb. 5, 4.25 p.m. Correct.—No. 17, Feb. 5,
4.5 p.m. Correct.—No. 18, Feb. 5, 3.45 p.m. Correct.
Remarks.—On Wed., Feb. 5, I hypnotised Miss A. at 3 p.m.
At 3.45, without passing from the hypnotic state, she made a
cross and wrote down the correct time. I aroused her at 4
o'clock and she carried out the remaining experiments correctly
at 4.5 and at 4.25.
Experiments, Wed., Feb. 5, 4 p.m.—No. 19. Sug.: in 10,050
m.—No. 20. Sug.: in 10,080m.—No. 21. Sug.: in 10,090 m.—
No. 22. Sug.: in 840 m.—No. 23. Sug.: in 900 m.
Miss A.'s calculations in hypnosis: " No. 19, Wed., Feb. 12,
3.30 p.m." " No. 20, Wed., Feb. 12, 4 p.m." " No. 21, Wed.,
Feb. 12, 4.10 p.m." " No. 22, Thur., Feb. 6, 6 a.m." " No.
23, Thur., Feb. 6, 7 a.m."
The above, made almost immediately, were correct in every
instance.
Reszilts.—No. 19, Wed., Feb. 12, 3.30 p.m. Correct.—No. 20,
Wed., Feb. 12, 4 p.m. Correct. —No. 21, Wed., Feb. 12, 4.10
p.m. Correct.—No. 22, Thur., Feb. 6, 6 a.m. Correct.—No. 23
Thur., Feb. 6, 7 a.m. Correct.
Remarks.—When Miss A.'s mother went to her bedroom on
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174 ORIGINAL ARTICLES AND CLINICAL CASES
the morning of the 6th, she found her asleep and two pieces of
paper on a table by the bedside. On each was a rough cross;
on one the figure 6, on the other 7, both very badly written.
Miss A. said she had not awakened during the night.
The other suggestions were carried out during hypnosis in
my room, the time being marked by Miss A. in my note book
and witnessed by others.
The five suggestions were given rapidly one after the other.
These, and similar complicated ones, were never read to the
subject more than twice, and sometimes only once.
I re-hypnotised Miss A. and questioned her about the sugges-
tions which had been carried out during the night, presumably
in natural sleep. She told me she remembered nothing about
them, and afterwards, when suggestions were again carried out
in natural sleep, her memory was equally at fault.
Experiments, Wed., Feb. 12.—No. 24, 3.30 p.m. Sug. : in
2,220 m.—No. 25, 3.30 p.m. Sug. : in 2,285 m.—No. 26, 3 p.m.
Sug. : in 10,115 m.—No. 27, 3 p.m. Sug. : in 10,150 m.—No.
28, 4 p.m. Sug. : in 20,190 m.
Miss A.'s calculations in hypnosis: "No. 24, in 18 h. and
40 m., or 10.10 to-morrow morning.—No. 25, to-morrow morning
at 11.15.—No. 26, next Wednesday at 25 m. to 4 p.m.—No. 27,
next Wednesday at 5.30 p.m.—No. 28, a fortnight and half an
hour."
The answers to Nos. 26, 27, 28, were given immediately. In
No. 24, Miss A.'s calculation was 18 h. and 20 m. too early, but
would have been correct if the interval suggested had been 1,120,
instead of 2,220 m. In No. 25, her calculation was 18 h. 20 m.
too early, but would have been correct had the suggested interval
been 1,185, instead of 2,285 m. In No. 26, her calculation was
correct. In No. 27, her calculation was 1 h. 20 m. too late.
Here the interval seems to have been taken as 7 d. 150 m.,
instead of 10,150 m. In No. 28, her calculation was correct as
far as it went, but the exact time of fulfilment was not given.
At the time I made the suggestions I also calculated when
they would fall due, thus : No. 24, Feb. 14, 5 a.m. Wrong ; half
an hour too late.—No. 25, Feb. 14, 6.5 a.m. Wrong; half an
hour too late.—No. 26, Feb. 19, 3.35 p.m. Eight.—No. 27, Feb.
19, 4.10 p.m.: Eight.—No. 28, Feb. 26, 4.25 p.m. Wrong ; 5 m.
too soon.
Res.: No. 24, Fri., Feb. 14, 4.30 a.m. Correct.—No. 25,
Fri., Feb. 14, 5.35 a.m. Correct.—No. 26, Wed., Feb. 19, 3.35
p.m. Correct.—No. 27, Wed., Feb. 19, 4.10 p.m. Correct. No.
28, Wed., Feb. 26, 4.30 p.m. Correct.
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HYPNOTIC AND POST-HYPNOTIC APPRECIATION OP TIME 175
Nos. 24 and 25 were fulfilled during sleep. On the 14th Miss
A., on awaking, found papers by her bedside with 4.30 and 5.35
written on them. On the 19th she was hypnotised in my room
at 3 p.m., and carried out Nos. 26 and 27 while in hypnosis. On
both occasions she wrote the time in my note book, and this was
witnessed. I asked her during hypnosis if she remembered my
last suggestion (No. 28), made the previous week. She said she
did and repeated it correctly, but stated she had never thought of
it since, and did not know when it would fall due, or the number
of minutes that had elapsed since it was given. She had ap-
parently forgotten that, when the suggestion was given, she had
calculated when it would fall due. No. 28 was executed
correctly during hypnosis on February 26.
Experiments, Wed., Feb. 19.—No. 29, 3.30 p.m. Sug. : in
720 m.—No. 30, 3.30 p.m. Sug.-: in 780 m.—No. 31, 3.30 p.m.
Sug.: in 2,160 m.—No. 32, 3 p.m. Sug.: in 10,135 m.—No. 33,
3 p.m. Sug. : in 20,210 m.
Miss A.'s calculations in hypnosis : These, with the exception
of No. 32, were all correct, and her replies were almost instanta-
neous. No. 32 was said to be due at 2.5 p.m. on Wed., Feb. 26.
This was 1 h. 50 m. too early, and represented an interval of 7 d.
less 55 m., instead of 7 d. plus 55 m.
Bes.—No. 29, Thur., Feb. 20, 3.30 a.m. Correct.—No. 30,
Thur., Feb. 20, 4.30 a.m. Correct.—No. 31, Fri., Feb. 21, 3.30
a.m. Correct.—No. 32, Wed., Feb. 26, 3.55 p.m. Correct.—
No. 33, Wed., Mar. 4, 3.50 p.m., was written down at 3.48. The
calculation, therefore, was correct, but the time appreciation 2 m.
too early.
Remarks.—On awaking at 7 o'clock on the morning of the
20th, Miss A. found a piece of paper with 3.30 marked on it,
and another with 4.30. On the morning of the 21st she found a
piece of paper with 3.30 marked on it. She had no recollec-
tion of waking during the night, and, as usual, questioning in
hypnosis failed to revive any memory of what she had done.
The other suggestions were fulfilled in my room and witnessed
by others.
Experiments, Wed., Feb. 26, 3.30 p.m.—No. 34. Sug. : in
2,140 m.— No. 35. Sug. : in 3,590 m.—No. 36. Sug.: in 5,030
m.—No. 37. Sug. : in 10,125 m.—No. 38. Sug.: in 10,100 m.
—No. 39. Sug.: in 20,180 m.
Bes. : No. 34, Fri., Feb. 28, 3.10 a.m. Correct.—No. 35,
Sat., Feb. 29, 3.20 a.m. Correct.—No. 36, Sun., Mar. 1, 3.20
a.m. Correct.—No. 27, due Wed., Mar. 4, at 4.15 p.m., was not
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176 ORIGINAL ARTICLES AND CLINICAL CASES
recorded.—No. 38, Wed., Mar. 4, 3.50 p.m., was written down at
3.48. Calculation therefore correct, but time appreciation 2 m. too
early.—No. 39, Wed., Mar. 11, 3.50 p.m., was written down at
3.51J. Calculation therefore correct, but time appreciation 1£ m.
too late.
Remarks.—These suggestions were only read to Miss A. once;
she was then asked to repeat them, arid did so correctly, with the
exception of No. 37. She was told not to make any calculations.
Nos. 34, 35 and 36 were executed during sleep, and the papers,
as usual, were found at Miss A.'s bedside in the morning. It is
to be noted that 3.50, March 4, the terminal time of No. 38, was
also the time at which another suggestion, made a fortnight
before, fell due, and which has already been recorded in its
proper place. Miss A. stated at 3.48 that she had to make two
crosses and to put down 3.50 twice. No. 37, due at 4.15 p.m.,
Wednesday, March 4, I have no record of. I am not certain
whether this was my fault or Miss A.'s ; I was hypnotising
another patient when the suggestions were fulfilled, and I might
well have omitted to enter that one ; on the other hand, Miss A.
might have failed to carry it out. Three suggestions fell due very
quickly, and one of them, as we have seen, belonged to another
series. When suggestions were made to fall due in a fortnight
and I saw the patient in the week between, I sometimes ques-
tioned her in hypnosis as to the unfulfilled ones; she always
assured me that she had never thought of them, did not know
how much of the time had elapsed, nor when they fell due.
Experiments, Wed., Mar. 4, 3.45 p.m.—No. 40. Sug.: in
10,080 m.—No. 41. Sug. : in 10,055 m.—No. 42. Sug.: in
10,040 m.—No. 43. Siig.: in 750 m.—No. 44. Sug.: in 2,160
m .—No. 45. Sug.: in 2,195 m.—Res. : No. 40, Wed., Mar. 11,
3.45 p.m., was written down at 3.44. Calculation correct; time
appreciation 1 m. too soon.—No. 41, Wed., Mar. 11,3.20 p.m.,
was written down at 3.22. Calculation correct; time appreciation
2 m. too slow.—No. 42, Wed., Mar. 11, 3.5 p.m. Correct.—
No. 43, Thur., Mar. 5, 4.15 a.m., during sleep. Correct.—No. 44,
Pri., Mar. 6, 3.45 a.m., during sleep. Correct.—No. 45, Fri.,
Mar. 6, 4.20 a.m., during sleep. Correct.
Remarks.—When these suggestions were given Miss A. was not
asked to calculate when they would fall due. Mr. Barkworth and
Dr. Barclay were present when Nos. 40, 41 and 42 were fulfilled.
At this stance, March 11, fresh suggestions were made under the
following conditions. Mr. Barkworth and Dr. Barclay were both
put en rapport with Miss A., and it was agreed that they should
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each make two time suggestions, arranged so as to fall due at
the next seance, when they promised to be present. These were
given when I was out of the room, and I was not told what
they were until after their fulfilment. The suggestions were as
follows:—
Experiments, Wed., Mar. 11, 4 p.m.—No. 46. Sug. : in
21,400 m.—No. 47. Sug. : in 21,420 m.—No. 48. Sug. : in
21,428 m.—No. 29. Sug.: in 21,434 m.—Res.: No. 46, Thurs.,
Mar. 26, 12.40 p.m., was written down at 12.38. Calculation
correct, time appreciation 2 m. too early.—No. 47, Thur., Mar.
26, 1 p.m., was written down at 12.59. Calculation correct, time
appreciation 1 m. too early.—No. 48, Thur., Mar. 26, 1.8 p.m.
Correct.—No. 49, Thur, Mar., 26, 1.14 p.m. Correct.
Bemarks.—Miss A. was hypnotised at 12.30 p.m. on Thurs-
day, March 26, and carried out the suggestions while in that
condition. Mr. Barkworth and Dr. Barclay were both present
and checked the time records. None of us, however, had any
idea whether the experiments were correctly carried out or not,
as Mr. Barkworth and Dr. Barclay had mislaid their notes and
were unable to recall the suggestions they had given. Miss A.
was roused from the hypnotic state and, as usual, remembered
nothing of the suggestions. She was then re-hypnotised, asked to
recall them, and replied as follows : "They were made at 4 p.m.
last Wednesday week and were to be fulfilled in 21,400, 21,420,
21,428 and 21,434 minutes. Mr. Barkworth and Dr. Barclay
gave two suggestions each." Miss A. stated that she had made
no calculation at the time and had not thought of the suggestions
afterwards. On April 22, Dr. Barclay sent me the lost memo-
randum of his two suggestions, viz., 21,428 and 21,434 minutes
from 4 p.m. on the day already mentioned. On April 27, Mr.
Barkworth wrote to tell me that he also had found his lost
memorandum, and that the suggestions were 21,400, 21,420,
21,428 and 21,434 minutes, the first two having been made by
himself, the two latter by Dr. Barclay. This agreed with Miss
A.'s account.
A fresh series of suggestions was made on April 8,- some
to fall due during the night, others the following week in my
presence. The patient lost her papers recording the former, and
I was too busy to enter the latter. These are the only experi-
ments in the whole series which are not recorded, and they are
omitted for the above reasons. Later, Miss A. found the records
of the suggestions, which had been carried out during natural
sleep. They were correct.
VOL. XXIII. 12
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178 ORIGINAL ARTICLES AND CLINICAL CASES
Experiments, Thur., May 7, 3 p.m.—No. 50. Sug. : in 8,650
m.—No. 51. Sug.: in 8,680 m.—No. 52. Sug. : in 8,700 m.
I still further complicated these by suggesting as follows :
" No. 50 is to be fulfilled in the waking state. Five minutes
before No. 51 falls due you are to pass into the hypnotic condi-
tion. No. 51 is to be fulfilled during hypnosis, but five minutes
afterwards you are to pass into the normal waking state and con-
tinue in that until after the execution of No. 52. Eight minutes
after No. 52 is carried out hypnosis will again appear."
Results.—No. 50. (a) Suggestion fulfilled, Wed., May 13,
3.10 p.m. Correct, (b) Hypnosis appeared at 3.31 p.m. This
ought to have been 3.35 p.m. and was therefore 4 minutes too
early.
No. 51, Wed., May 13, 3.40 p.m. (a) Suggestion fulfilled
during hypnosis. Correct, (b) Miss A. passed spontaneously into
the normal state at 3.45. Correct.
No. 52, 4 p.m. (a) Suggestion fulfilled in the waking state.
Correct, (b) Hypnosis appeared exactly at 4.8. Correct.
Remarks.—On May 13, Miss A. came into my consulting
room at 3.5 p.m., and almost immediately fainted. She had
recently met with a severe accident and was in acute suffering.
Immediately on regaining consciousness she said she had to
make a cross at 3.10, and did so in my case book; others were
present in the room when all the suggestions were fulfilled with
the exception of the first.
Experiments, Wed., May 13, 4.30 p.m.—The suggestions
were given in the following general terms : " You are to repeat
all the experiments made last Thursday, but to-day you are to
start from 2.55 instead of 3 p.m., and to each suggestion you are
to add 1,440 minutes." The original suggestions were not cited,
nor any other information given. The experiments, therefore,
were as follows :—
No. 53, Wed., May 13, 4.30 p.m. Sug. : in 8,650 m. from
3 p.m., plus 1,440 m., minus 5 m. from starting point.—No. 54,
Wed., May 13, 4.30 p.m. Sug.: in 8,680 m. from 3 p.m., plus
1,440 m., minus 5 m. from starting point.—No. 55, Wed., May
13, 4.30 p.m. Sug.: in 8,700 m. plus 1,440 m., minus 5 m. from
starting point.
Results.—No. 53, Wed., May 20, 3.5 p.m. Fulfilled in the
waking state. Correct. Hypnosis appeared at 3.30. Correct.
No. 54, Wed., May 20, 3.35 p.m. In hypnosis. Correct.
Miss A. passed spontaneously into the normal state at 3.40.
Correct.
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According to the original suggestions, Miss A. was to remain
in the normal state until the fulfilment of the next experiment,
but, as she had a severe headache, I hypnotised her, made
curative suggestions, and told her hypnosis would terminate one
minute before the next experiment fell due. She passed into the
normal waking state at 3.49, six minutes too soon.—No. 55,
Wed., May 20, 3.55 p.m. was written down at 3.50. Calculation,
therefore, correct, but time appreciation 5 minutes too early.
I re-hypnotised Miss A. immediately the above experiment
was fulfilled. At 4.3 p.m., while still in the hypnotic state, she
said it was 3 minutes past 4, and that I had suggested that
hypnosis would appear at that hour. This was correct.
Bemarks.—It is to be noted that hypnosis appeared at
3.30 p.m., the exact time suggested. This is particularly inter-
esting as the experiment, correctly executed at 3.30 on May 20,
was the erroneously carried out experiment of May 13, compli-
cated by five minutes having been deducted from its starting
point and 1,440 added to its interval.
No. 55 was the last experiment of the series. A few others,
similar in character, were made in October, 1896. These were
successful but presented no fresh features, and as Miss A. had to
cease her visits, owing to her approaching marriage, further
experiment was impossible.
Summary.—Fifty-five experiments are cited; of these
one, apparently, was either not carried out by Miss A., or
unrecorded by me, while in another (No. 9) she mistook the
original suggestion, but fulfilled it correctly in accordance
with what she thought it had been. Forty-five were com-
pletely successful, i.e., not only did Miss A. write down the
correct terminal time, but this was done, also, at the moment
the experiment fell due. Eight (Nos. 33, 38, 39, 40, 41, 46,
47, 55) were partially successful. In these the terminal
time was correctly recorded in every instance, but there
were minute differences, never exceeding five minutes,
between the patient's correct estimate of when the sugges-
tion fell due and the moment at which she carried it out.
The proportion which these errors bear to their respective
intervals varies between 1 to 2,028 and 1 to 21,420. The
following table gives an analysis of the conditions under
which the experiments were carried out and their results :—
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Similar experiments, more or less successful, were made
with other somnambules, but in none were the results so
striking as with Miss A. In those about to be cited the
subject was Miss B., aged 20, an intelligent, well-educated
girl, who had received some scientific training. Her
arithmetical powers were superior to Miss A.'s, but she
possessed no particular aptitude for appreciating the passage
of time. She was a somnambule, could be rendered
anaesthetic and analgesic by suggestion, and had been the
subject of several painless minor surgical operations. Her
health, from the commencement of the experiments to the
present date (August, 1900) has been good.
The first experiments consisted in determining by
suggestion the time of waking from normal sleep. The
hours selected varied widely; but the results were almost
uniformly successful and the greatest error recorded did not
exceed five minutes. Others similar to Miss A.'s followed
thus:—
Exp. 1, Nov. 25, 1895, 3.55 p.m. Sug.: in 24 h. and 50 m.
Res.: Correct. Remarks: In reply to questioning in hypnosis,
Miss B. stated that when the suggestion was given she calculated
when it would fall due and determined to carry it out at that
hour.—Exp. 2, Nov. 27, 1.20 p.m. Sug.: in 1,445 m. Res.:
10 m. too early.—Exp. 3, Dec. 6, 3 p.m. Sug.: in 1,440 m.
Res.: Correct.—Exp. 4, Dec. 9, 3.15 p.m. Sug. : in 2,880 m.
Res.: Correct.—Exp. 5, Dec. 12, 3.30 p.m. Sug. : in 1,540 m.
Res. : 7 m. too late.—Exp. 6, Dec. 16, 3.30 p.m. Sug. : in
1,620 m. Res. : 13 m. too late.— Exp. 7, Dec. 20, 3 p.m.
Sug.: in 1,380 m. Res. : Correct.—Exp. 8, Dec. 31, 3.15 p.m.
Sug.: in 24 h. 1,200 m. Res. : Correct.— Exp. 9, Jan. 2,
1896 ; 3.10 p.m. Sug.: in 24 h. 1,430 m. Miss B.'s calcula-
tion, made in hypnosis, was 40 m. too early. Res. : 5 m. too
late.—Exp. 10, Jan. 6, 3.15 p.m. Sug. : in 24 h. 100 m.
Miss B.'s calculation in hypnosis was correct. Res.: 8 m. too
late.—Exp. 11, Jan. 27, 3.10 p.m. Sug.: in 24 h. 150 m.
Miss B.'s calculation in hypnosis was correct. Res. : 10 m.
too soon.— Exp. 12, Mar. 27, 3.10 p.m. Sug. : in 24 h. 240 m.
Miss B.'s calculation in hypnosis was correct. Res. : Correct.
Time experiments more or less closely resembling those cited
have been occasionally repeated with Miss B. up to the present
date (August, 1900) and with practically identical results.
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Before considering theoretical explanations of hypnotic
and post-hypnotic appreciation of time, I propose to discuss
(A) the possibilities of mal-observation or deception, and
(J3) to draw attention to certain other points which appear
worthy of notice.
(A) The Question of Mal-observation or Deception.
(1) The subjects of all my time experiments were either
former patients or personal friends. None of them were
trained hypnotic subjects, and in no single instance was a
pecuniary reward promised or given. All this, however,
does not in itself exclude the possibility of mal-observation
or deception, and I would rather base my arguments in
favour of the genuineness of the results on post-hypnotic
amnesia, and the fact that the problems involved were
beyond the subject's waking powers.
(2) While, however, all observers recognise post-hypnotic
amnesia, it must still be admitted that loss of memory
might be assumed for purposes of deception. Fortunately,
there are other hypnotic phenomena impossible of imitation;
amongst these may be cited: (a) the absence of certain
organic changes following injury (Delboeuf's case of two
symmetrical burns), and (b) the absence of physiological
signs of pain during severe and prolonged operation. The
latter fact was clearly demonstrated in the operations on my
patients at Goole and Leeds (Journal of Dental Science,
March 30, 1890, and Lancet, April 5, 1890). Several of
these patients were afterwards the subjects of my time
experiments, and all who were employed for this purpose,
including Miss A. and Miss B., could be easily rendered
anaesthetic or analgesic by suggestion.
(3) Post-hypnotic amnesia alone, even when it is un-
doubtedly genuine, does not exclude possible error, as the
subject might receive information from the operator or
spectators. It is, however, difficult to say how this could
have happened in Miss A.'s case. Thus, twenty-seven
experiments were fulfilled in my absence, and no informa-
tion regarding these—excluding, of course, the suggestions
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made to Miss A. during hypnosis—was given to anyone
until some time after the whole series was completed. I did
not calculate when any of these twenty-seven suggestions
would fall due, and did not know, until after their fulfilment,
whether they had been carried out correctly or not. Twenty-
seven further experiments were fulfilled in my presence,
these, with one exception, were also witnessed by others.
In four of them the suggestions were made by Mr. Bark-
worth'and Dr. Barclay, and I did not know what they were
until afterwards. These two operators, however, could not
assist the subject, as they had lost the memoranda of their
suggestions and were unable to recall the figures. In the
remaining twenty-three, none of the spectators knew what
the suggestions were. Indeed, in most instances, they did
not know that any experiments were being carried on, until
they saw them executed and were asked to witness the
figures, their ignorance being purposely arranged.
(4) In the twenty-three cases just cited, before giving
the suggestions, I calculated when they would fall due.
Could Miss A. have learnt anything about this through
telepathy or muscle-reading ? During the last ten years, I
have searched for evidence of telepathy and also taken part
in the experiments of other observers ; the results, however,
have invariably been negative ; if, for argument's sake,
we conceded the possibility of telepathy, recognising that
somnambules possess hypersesthesia of the special senses, it
would still be difficult to see what information Miss A. could
have obtained from me. In the majority of the experiments
I did not work out when the suggestions would fall due, and
even when I did, many of my calculations were only
approximately correct, although I was not aware of this
until after all the experiments were completed. Moreover, I
I have an unusually bad memory for figures, and never either
before or during the execution of the suggestions, recalled
my calculations as to the time at which they were supposed
to fall due. Further, when the experiments were carried
out I was nearly always busily engaged with other patients
and so placed that Miss A. could not see my face.
(5) Again, even supposing post-hypnotic amnesia had
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not existed in Miss A.'s case, the retention in the waking
state of the memories of hypnotic life would not in itself
explain her feats in calculation and time appreciation.
Miss A.'s memory, knowledge of arithmetic and power of
appreciating time, in no way exceeded that of other imper-
fectly educated girls in her station of life. Her normal
memory was incapable of retaining complicated series of
figures, and she was unable to make even much simpler
mental calculations than those involved. After the sugges-
tions were made, she remained in the hypnotic state for an
hour or more and could not consult the clock. During this
period it was absolutely impossible for her to record the
suggestion in any way other than mentally.
(B) Other Points of Interest.
(1) Five minutes before the first experiment was fulfilled,
Miss A. became restless and felt she must do something.
This preliminary stage of restlessness was absent in all the
others. In them, when the time for carrying out the
suggestions arrived, Miss A. had a sudden twitching of the
fingers of her right hand, immediately followed by the idea
of writing down certain figures. The abruptness of this
invasion of the normal consciousness, by a message from
the subliminal one, was particularly noticeable when Miss A.
was actively engaged in conversation at the time.
(2) On twenty-four occasions Miss A. was asked to
calculate when the suggestions fell due; she was wrong in
the first nine instances, but in the remaining fifteen right
in eleven and wrong in four. As the experiments advanced,
not only the frequency, but also the extent of Miss A.'s
errors in calculation decreased, and the answers were given
much more rapidly. Sometimes the correct replies were
almost instantaneous, and in these instances no conscious
calculation could be traced. It is to be noted that Miss
A.'s mistaken calculations had no effect on the correctness
of her results.
(3) Memory.—Once only did Miss A. spontaneously recall
in hypnosis that a time suggestion—yet unfulfilled—had
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been given. This was Experiment No. 3, where the sugges-
tion was an easily remembered one, viz., 24 hours and 100
minutes. On other occasions when Miss A. was questioned
in hypnosis as to the unfulfilled suggestions, she invariably
recalled the fact that these had been made, but rarety
remembered their exact terms. She always asserted that
she had never thought of them, did not know how much
time had elapsed since they had been given, nor when they
were due. This was so even in cases where she had cal-
culated the terminal time. At first Miss A. forgot all about
the suggestions immediately after they were fulfilled ; she
did not know she had made a cross or written down the
figures, and could not recall what they meant. This con-
dition of memory was identical with what is almost
universally associated with post-hypnotic acts. Later, for
convenience' sake, it was suggested to Miss A. during
hypnosis that she should remember having executed the
experiments. She then knew in the waking state that she
had made a cross and written down certain figures, but
recalled nothing of the original suggestion, of which these
acts were the fulfilment. When Miss A. was questioned in
hypnosis, after the execution of the suggestions, her memory,
on certain points, was very clear. She could recall in every
detail the terms of all experiments that had recently been
carried out, i.e., she remembered the hours at which they
had been made, the number of minutes suggested, her own
calculations, if any, and the moment and circumstances
under which the suggestions had been fulfilled. Putting
aside the calculations she made at the time, in response to
suggestion, she was unable to recall having made any others,
or to give any information as to the methods by means of
which she had correctly fulfilled the experiments. When a
second series of suggestions was given, before the first had
been fulfilled, after all had been carried out, she could recall
both series and place each member of them in its proper
order. This memory, however, was not persistent. A
fortnight after the experiments had been executed, although
Miss A. still remembered in hypnosis that they had taken
place, she was unable to recall the details. When experi-
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ments were fulfilled in normal sleep she remembered their
terms in hypnosis and when they had been given, but not
when they had been executed.
(4) The experiments had no prejudicial effect on Miss
A.'s health. On the contrary, this steadily improved. She
is now a strong, healthy, well-developed woman, the mother
of two children, and has had no return of her nervous
symptoms.
In no single instance did any bad effect, even of the
most trivial description, follow hypnotic experiment.
(5) The results of the experiments were only estimated
after the series was completed, when a friend, Mr. Bartrum,
B.Sc, kindly checked them for me. He discovered that
some of my calculations made at the time had been erro-
neous. I am also indebted to him for a critical examination
of the calculations the patient was asked to make when the
suggestions were given.
(6) With the following exception, the phenomena ob-
served in the cases of Miss A. and Miss B. differed little.
When a simple suggestion was given, Miss B. sometimes
spontaneously calculated when it would fall due. Miss A.,
on the other hand, never made any spontaneous calculations
at all. Apparently Miss B. did not spontaneously calculate
the more complicated arithmetical problems. When she did
so, in response to suggestion, her results were invariably
correct, but, despite this, the experiments were not always
fulfilled at their appropriate time. Miss A., on the contrary,
was often wrong in her calculations, while the suggestions
themselves were carried out with phenomenal accuracy.
(7) In some recent instances Miss B. apparently made
no spontaneous calculations, despite the fact that the
arithmetical problems involved were extremely simple.
For example, I suggested that she should shake hands with
me forty minutes after I aroused her from hypnosis. At the
moment indicated, in the midst of an animated conversation,
she suddenly asked me to shake hands with her. In reply
to my questions, she said she had felt impelled to do this,
but could not tell why. A few minutes later she had entirely
forgotten the incident. I re-hypnotised her ; she then re-
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called the suggestion and the impulse she had experienced,
but could not remember having made any calculation or
having in any way marked the passage of time.
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS.
Delboeuf, as we have seen, pointed out that the terminal
day in Beaunis and Liegeois' experiments fell on an easily
recognised date with which the subjects were acquainted.
These experiments, he said, did not show, as they were
supposed to do, that somnambules possessed the power of
counting days, but only that they were able to retain a given
date. To remove this objection his suggestions were made
in minutes, while the majority of mine were given in a
similar but even more complicated form. In explaining
the phenomena, therefore, we must take into account, not
only the appreciation of the passage of time, but also the
feats of memory and arithmetical calculation which some-
times exceeded the subject's normal powers.
Bernheim's Theory.
This is mainly based on the supposed occurrence of self-
hypnosis in somnambules and the existence during that
condition of a peculiar mental concentration, with conse-
quent revival of hypnotic memories. According to Bern-
heim, conscious mental activity exists both in sleep and in
hypnosis. During sleep we are conscious that our mind-
thinks and works, just as the somnambulist knows what he
is doing, but the form of consciousness differs from that of
waking life. In both, concentration of the nervous force
upon the suggested image or idea is the characteristic
phenomenon. This continues to exist, although dream
succeeds dream in sleep and varying suggestions are
instantly executed in hypnosis; the nervous concentration
has only changed its object, the focus shifted its place.
According to Bernheim, if an individual goes to sleep
determined to wake at a given hour, his attention is fixed
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upon this idea, and he thinks about it voluntarily and
consciously all night. When he awakes, he believes he has
done so spontaneously, as the conscious thoughts of sleep
are forgotten. Finally, he says, the lost memories of
hypnosis may be revived by chance association of ideas, like
forgotten impressions of the waking state, and also in other
ways, and thus, the memory of the suggestion has not been
latent all the time. In support of this he cites :—
First—'Experiments.—Two subjects, who had received
deferred suggestions, when hypnotised and questioned in the
interval, stated that during natural sleep they had once
dreamt of what had been suggested during hypnosis.
Secondly—Certain general observations as to the mental
condition in somnambules.—The memory, he says, of what
has taken place during hypnosis depends upon the psychical
concentration already referred to; every time this is repro-
duced, the lost memory is revived. Somnambules pass
easily and spontaneously from the normal to the hypnotic
state; they then become self-absorbed and concentrated,
and recall the operator's suggestions. They know when
these should be executed and take their measures accord-
ingly; they reinforce the idea of not forgetting them, just
as a person in natural sleep determines not to miss the hour
set for waking. Although the suggestion may have been
present in their minds the greater part of the day, they
forget this if we divert their attention from themselves by
speaking to them. By doing this, we have disturbed their
psychical concentration, drawn their cerebral activity from
the inside to the outside, and produced another state of
consciousness in which the memory of the suggestion is
lost; the memories of the second, or hypnotic state, being
effaced in the first, or normal, one.
In consequence of tbis, when the somnambule carries
out a suggestion, he believes that the idea has newly and
spontaneously dawned in his mind—"He no longer remem-
bers that it is a memory." Thus, in Bernheim's opinion, a
deferred suggestion is no more difficult to explain than one
executed immediately on waking.
Three points are involved in Bernheim's theory.
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(1) Nervous concentration and its relationship to hypnotic
memory.—According to Bernheim, everyone possesses a
certain definite amount of nervous force or cerebral activity.
In the waking state this is concentrated in the higher
nervous centres — the reasoning part of the brain; in
hypnosis in the lower ones—the imaginative or automatic
part. All the phenomena induced during hypnosis—con-
ceptions, movements, sensations, images—owe their origin
to this concentrated and accumulated nervous force. When
the subject passes into the normal state this nervous con-
centration ceases, and the impressions received during
hypnosis fade. When hypnosis is again induced, the former
state of concentration reappears and, at the same time, the
lost memories are revived.
This explanation is ingenious, but not in keeping with
observed facts. If I suggest to a subject that he will still
remember the events of hypnosis, after that state has termi-
nated, he invariably does so. Yet, according to Bernheim's
theory, the redistribution of nervous force to the higher
centres should inevitably have prevented this. Again, sug-
gestion may rob the hypnotised subject of the power of
recalling the events of previous hypnoses. If, however,
Bernheim's explanation be correct, the lost memories could
not escape revival, seeing that they must have reappeared
when the nervous force was again concentrated in the lower
centres.
Further, as numerous and varied hypnotic phenomena
can be simultaneously evoked in the same subject, this
clearly shows that the phenomena of hypnosis cannot be
explained by the concentration of attention on any one given
point. Again, the fact that the multiple phenomena are
sometimes similar in character to the isolated ones, indicates
that the explanation of hypnotic phenomena by means of
the amount of attention concentrated is also fallacious. If
all the attention is requisite for the production of one hyp-
notic phenomenon and yet, while it still lasts, many others
are simultaneously induced, whence do these derive that
excessive amount of attention which is said to be necessary
for the induction of the primary phenomenon ?
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(2) Admitting that hypnotic memory is associated with
this psychical concentration, the evidence in favour of the
frequent and spontaneous occurrence of the latter is far from
convincing. Granting that two subjects had each once
dreamt of a suggestion during natural sleep, this does not
justify the conclusion that somnambules pass easily and
spontaneously from the normal to the hypnotic state. Fur-
ther, although the memories of hypnosis, whether self-
induced or not, are lost on waking, these can be easily
evoked by questioning in subsequent hypnoses. If, there-
fore, subjects passed spontaneously into the hypnotic state,
and thought about the suggestions, they could be made to
recall the fact that they had done so. Despite this, Bern-
heim's generalisations are founded on the two dreams just
cited; and he has apparently made no attempt to discover
the actual mental conditions involved, although he might
easily have done this by means of the simple method of
interrogation in subsequent hypnoses.
(3) Granting both the points in dispute, i.e., the psychi-
cal concentration and its spontaneous occurrence, the diffi-
culty is still unsolved. If no trace of the hypnotic memory
remains in the normal state, what advantage does the nor-
mal consciousness obtain from the unknown or forgotten
fact that the hypnotic consciousness recalled the suggestion
at some time before the date fixed for its fulfilment ?
Beaunis' Objections.
Beaunis also raises many objections to Bernheim's views.
Thus, while admitting the influence of attention and con-
centration upon the production of certain hypnotic phe-
nomena, he holds that these are insufficient to explain
deferred suggestions. They may account for a hallucination
realised immediately on waking, but not for one that has
been retarded for several days. Here, the subject was un-
conscious of the suggestion until the hallucination appeared
at the hour fixed, and it is absurd to suppose that all this
time he was under the influence of a dominant idea. Bern-
heim's experiments, therefore, do not settle the question.
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Granting that the subject dreamt of the suggestion in normal
sleep two days before it fell due, it is still necessary to
explain how it was carried out at the time fixed. The sug-
gestion, it is true, now involves a shorter period of time,
i.e., two days instead of the original number, but this, while
reducing the extent of the problem, still leaves it unsolved.
Beaunis disputes Bernheim's assertion that those who
wish to wake at a given hour think of this all night, for, he
says, if this were true, they would afterwards remember
having done so. Dreams which have passed rapidly through
the brain can often be recalled in every detail; we should,
therefore, be able to remember still more vividly the ideas
upon which our attention has been continuously fixed.
Further, some people always know what o'clock it is, and,
if suddenly asked, are able to give an exact reply, no matter
how much their attention may have been concentrated on
other, things. Had they consciously noted the passage of
time, they would afterwards be able to recall having done so.
This, however, is not the case, and they are unable to explain
how the feat was performed.
Finally, in contradistinction to Bernheim, Beaunis justly
points out that important differences exist between the way
in which tbe lost memories of the waking state and those
of hypnosis are revived. The former may be recalled at any
time by a chance association of ideas. For example, things
long forgotten may be remembered on hearing the name of
someone we knew in childhood. The lost memories of
hypnosis, however, possess the distinctive and essential
characteristic that they cannot be revived by a chance
association of ideas, and are, therefore, fundamentally dif-
ferent from those of the waking state. The hypnotic sug-
gestion is only realised at the hour fixed and cannot take
place before, even when associations occur which would
have restored lost normal memory. Thus, if it is suggested
to A. that he is to. do something at the expiration of ten days,
when he hears B. cough three times, B.'s signals, if given
at any time before the day fixed, produce no response,
although they inevitably do so when the appropriate time
arrives.*
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Beaunis' Theory.
Beaunis attempts to explain the phenomena of time
appreciation by the existence in the human organism of an
unconscious physiological power of time measurement. The
phenomena of deferred suggestion, he says, is analogous to
that of awaking at a fixed hour from normal sleep, and both
may be explained by the existence of a sort of mental
mechanism, arranged, like an alarm clock, to produce a
movement at a fixed hour. The brain is a machine which
acts without our knowledge, with an activity we are unable
to estimate, and the things of which we are conscious only
feebly represent this mysterious work. The power of
appreciating time, rudimentary or rather atrophied in
civilised man, is well developed in the savage and lower
animals. Thus a dog, accustomed to go out with his master
at a certain hour, will show that the time has arrived by
expressive pantomime, should his master delay a little in
getting ready for his walk. In Beaunis' opinion, the
measurement of time by somnambules is an act of un-
conscious cerebration.
Paul Janet's Objections.
Janet grants that an image of which one is unconscious
may exist in the memory, and, further, that it can be revived,
even at a fixed date, if the operator associates the suggestion
with some definite sensation, as, for example, the sight of
a particular person. He cannot, however, understand the
return of the lost memory at a fixed day, without other
association than the numeration of time. Thirteen days,
for example, do not represent a sensation, but form an
abstraction. The carrying out of a suggestion, therefore,
at the expiration of such a period, presupposes the existence
of an unconscious power of measuring time—an entirely
unknown faculty. Up to this everything could be explained
by the law of association of ideas, but here we make a sudden
jump, and the thread of analogy is completely broken. No
association can explain the unconscious counting of thirteen
days, and the " suggestion theory " is in default.
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Beaunis' Beply.
A day is not an abstraction. The idea of a day represents
a series of definite impressions, the result of external agencies,
such as light, temperature, &c, which produce in our organism
different kinds of reactions. A day is, then in reality, not a
sensation, but a succession of sensations and unconscious
reactions. Animals know exactly the hour at which they are
habitually fed, and an attack of fever returns at the same
hour each day, or every other day, for weeks; this indicates
that the measurement of time is not an abstraction, but has
its roots in the very life of the organism. The periodicity
of days, weeks, months and seasons corresponds to periodic
organic variations, which under certain circumstances might
acquire sufficient intensity to constitute a sort of " un-
conscious faculty for measuring time," although the word
"faculty" is a little too philosophic a term for an organic
aptitude of this kind.
Remarks.
Beaunis' explanation assumes (1) the existence of an
unconscious faculty for measuring time, and (2) its applica-
bility to the cases in question.
(1) The unconscious measurement of time.—According to
Beaunis, time appreciation is highly developed in savages,
while certain civilised persons can awake at a given hour,
and others always know what o'clock it is. In support of
this, however, he does not cite a single example or experi-
ment. Let us take the simplest case, i.e., waking at a given
hour. Many persons, it is true, believe they can do this ;
usually, however, the self-waker only shows the power of
giving himself a lighter sleep than usual; he wakes several
times during the night, and, in the end, does not always hit
the exact hour. On behalf of the Society for Psychical
Research, several persons, who believed they possessed this
power of self-waking, tested it in a rigorously scientific
manner. The results were disappointing. One experimenter
only succeeded on two occasions out of seventeen, and one
of these was his usual hour of waking; another was success-
ful on five times out of twenty-nine, but on three of these he
VOL. XXIII. 13
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awoke at other hours as well, while the third was right two
out of thirteen times, and the fourth succeeded in four
instances out of forty-six.
Since I became interested in time appreciation, many
people have assured me that they could awake at any given
hour. None of them, however, were able to experimentally
reproduce the alleged phenomenon, while the two following
are the only genuine cases I know of :—
Dr. George Savage possesses the power of waking at a given
hour and has tested it on many occasions. The following is an
example :—One day, having to catch an early train, he determined
to wake at 6 a.m., and slept soundly without waking until the
exact time. The seven following mornings he woke exactly at
six, notwithstanding that he went to bed at different hours, and
there was no necessity for early rising. This involuntary
repetition of self-waking at unusual times also occurred when he
was roused by others at abnormally early hours. Thus, when in
the Alps, if he were called at 2 or 3 a.m., he would certainly wake
spontaneously at the same hour next morning, even if he had
been much fatigued with climbing. Dr. Savage states that the
accuracy of the time of waking in these instances has puzzled
him greatly.
The following is Professor Marcus Hartog's own account
of his case :—
" When I was a student, under 17, I found I could, sleeping
soundly, awake at any given time I had set myself overnight-
The peculiarity of such waking was that it was always sudden
and complete, not preceded by a period of light broken sleep, nor
accompanied by the drowsiness of an ordinary unprepared
waking. If I found that it was needless to get up I soon fell
asleep again, and then had the ordinary drowsy waking, often
oversleeping myself. This faculty has persisted with me.
Between the ages of 20 and 25, on three distinct occasions I had
to nurse friends, when I had to administer food and medicines at
regular intervals, as well as to attend to every call or unrest on
the part of the patient. The last occasion extended over, I think,
three weeks. On each occasion the facility and manner of
waking completely and suddenly was exactly the same as for
early rising, whether at the stated call, or at the least stir of the
patient. On lying down to rest again I seemed to see a gradually
widening vista, and as my eyes diverged I fell asleep; the time
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occupied could not have been a quarter of a minute, though I felt
wide awake at the moment of closing my eyes. My sleep on
these occasions was singularly if not absolutely dreamless, though
I was under the greatest mental anxiety while waking."
In Professor Hartog's case the waking at fixed hours was
never involuntarily repeated, i.e., as regards the waking at
repeated intervals. Sometimes, however, when he set
himself to wake at a fixed time in the morning this was
repeated for several days, as in Dr. Savage's case.
(2) The applicability of Beaunis' theory to the par-
ticular cases in question.—The experiences of Savage and
Hartog undoubtedly show that certain persons can wake
at a given hour. This does not, however, explain why this
power is almost universal amongst somnambules ; it is an
attempt to explain the little known in terms of the less
known, and the analogy, even if successfully established,
does not solve the problem but adds another to it. Grant-
ing that the uncivilised man possesses some natural power
of marking the passage of time, it would be of little use to
him in cases such as those cited by Delboeuf and myself.
If he cannot count above five how is be to bring his powers
to bear on a suggestion which starts from, say, 3.15 p.m.
yesterday and is to terminate in 20,840 minutes ?
Delboeuf's Theory.
Delbceuf first pointed out that his subjects in the normal
state were unable to make the necessary calculations in-
volved in his time experiments. As the latter were success-
ful this showed, he said, that the subjects, when hypnotised,
had an idea of the passage of time and unconsciously
calculated when the suggestions fell due. Apparently they
possessed a sort of mechanism like an alarm which they
set to go off at a fixed time.
Edmund Gurney's Objections to the Theories of Delboeuf
and Beaunis.
According to Gurney, commands to be fulfilled at a
particular date involved the reckoning of time. This was
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usually assumed to be physiological. Thus, Delboeuf
believed that the subject calculated when the order fell
due, and said to himself : " I shall fall into a trance at such
and such a moment and then perform the act." The
subject set his organism like an alarm for a given time
ahead; his mind, relieved of responsibility, then went off
duty till the suggestion fell due, when it was aroused by
its own automatic machinery, the action resembling the
running down of an alarm. Gurney asserted that hypnotic
subjects never formulated their orders in this way, and that
Delbceuf's explanation was pure guess work, unsupported by
fact.
Further, he said, even if we granted the purely physio-
logical hypothesis for cases of short duration, where the
idea of the time fixed could be easily grasped, and thus the
setter of the alarm knew exactly what he was about—it
would be a very different thing to extend it to others where
the command had been executed after the lapse of months.
Gurney, like Delboeuf, drew a distinction between com-
mands to be carried out at a specific date, such as New
Year's Day, and those where the length of time alone was
named, as in the direction to do something " on the 69th
day from this." In the former instance the brain might
at once register the date along with the order, and the
arrival of the former would thus suffice to arouse the latter.
A length of time could not be registered in this way. Its
termination, till reckoned by the calendar, was quite in-
definite, and when the particular day arrived it conveyed
nothing likely to revive the suggestion—it carried no more
sixty-ninthness about it than any other day.
Gurney considered that Beaunis' explanation did not
fully meet Janet's objection that such a length of time—
i.e., 69 days—was simply an abstraction. Admitting that
" a day" was a sufficiently familiar and definite unit to
present a concrete character, that it represented a series
of conscious reactions, and, further, that there were periodic
organic changes which extended over weeks and months,
this did not prove that " the measurement of time was not
an abstraction, but had its roots and conditions in the very
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life of the organism." It did not follow that " sixty-nine
days" were concrete in character because this was the case
with " one day," and, further, the organic conditions asso-
ciated with established physiological periods were absent
from those suddenly and arbitrarily fixed by human volition.
The vital processes were as unable to.make a time calculation
of this kind as a school boy's digestion to work out a propo-
sition of Euclid. Such time measurement was not a function
of animal life; its result was not an inevitable bodily state,
but a needless act. It depended—not on progressive changes
in the stomach or blood—but on an original course of cere-
bration taking place in the higher tracts of the brain,
initiated by an impression—that of the command—which
had a distinct psychical side.
According to Gurney, the passage of time must be
registered, looking at it from the brain side alone, not by
general gradual change, but by a series of specific changes
corresponding to the days and units of measurement, and
this was the only kind of cerebral process capable of clearly
differentiating the case from that of ordinary physiological
time reckoning. Further, unless cerebral events such as
were normally correlated with the ideas "sixty," "sixty-one,"
"sixty-two," &c, really took place, how could the gulf be
spanned with precision ? Any other kind of change would
not know when to stop, or how to associate a point it had
reached with the order given long before. Granting that
these specific brain-changes took place, was it not reasonable
to suppose that their mental correlate existed; and that,
hidden from our view, there was an actual watching of the
course of time ? This hypothesis went a long way towards
removing Paul Janet's difficulty. From this point of view
his " unknown faculty " resolved itself into a known one,
working in the normal way, but below the surface of ordinary
consciousness.
Gurney's Theory.
As we have seen, the carrying out of a post-hypnotic
command several thousand minutes after waking can neither
be explained by any ordinary physiological power of appre-
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•ciating time, nor by a supposed spontaneous re-hypnosis with
temporary revival of memory. The feat, according to Gurney,
can only be performed as the result of the intelligent action
of a secondary consciousness, which watches the time as it
passes just as the ordinary one would do, and, when the
correct hour arrives, pushes the ordinary consciousness on
one side, takes its place and carries out the command. In
Gurney's opinion, the mental conditions involved in the
execution of post-hynotic commands varied widely in
different cases. Of these the following are examples :—
(1) A subject was told to do something ten minutes after
she awoke. On waking she looked at the clock until the
expiration of the time, then executed the order. In this
case, the subject was conscious of having consulted the clock,
and afterwards—apart from any question of the revival
of hypnotic memory in post-hypnotic states—remembered
having done so.
(2) A subject was told to do something five minutes after
he awoke. Immediately on waking he looked at the clock
and continued to do so at intervals, talking naturally mean-
while to those present. At the end of five minutes he
executed the order. Afterwards, he neither recollected
looking at the clock, nor carrying out the command.
This case appears to occupy an intermediate position
between No. 1 and the others about to be cited.
(3) A subject was told that on the 39th day from then
he was to execute a post-hypnotic suggestion. He had no
memory of the command when awake, and no reference was
made to it until March 19, when he was suddenly asked,
during hypnosis, how many days had elapsed since it was
given. He instantly replied, " Sixteen," and added that
there were twenty-three more to run. Both statements
were correct.
(4) Another subject was told on March 26, that he was
to do something on the 123rd day from then. On April 18,
he was hypnotised and asked if he remembered the order.
He at once replied: "Yes, this is the twenty-third day; a
hundred more." Further questioning made it clear that
every few days the command occurred to his mind and that
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he calculated how many days had passed and how many
more had to elapse. His waking memory retained no
recollection of the original suggestion, nor was it aware
of the memories and calculations which he described when
hypnotised.
In the two last cases, the watching was undoubtedly
wholly of an internal kind, and, although obviously accom-
panied by consciousness, was afterwards entirely forgotten.
The two points in. Gurney's theory which specially de-
mand consideration are : (I.) What evidence have we of the
existence of a secondary consciousness ? (II.) Granting its
existence, how far does it explain all the phenomena we
have been considering ?
(I.) The secondary or subliminal consciousness.
The facts in favour of the existence of a secondary
consciousness may be divided into three groups : (a) Those
arising from, or more or less closely associated with, morbid
states ; (b) Those occurring in normal waking or sleeping
life; (c) Those arising spontaneously, or as the result of
suggestion, in the hypnotic condition.
(a.) To those who have not studied hypnotic and cognate
phenomena, this group is practically the only one that exists.
Its most familiar examples are to be found in post-epileptic
and other more or less clearly denned morbid conditions.
Here the personality of the secondary consciousness is
generally a reduced one; volition is frequently suspended
or weakened, and consciousness dimmed. The individual
does not recognise himself, his surroundings and mental
state, in as clear a fashion as he would do were he in his
normal condition.
The case of Louis V. is one of the most interesting of this
kind. This young man presented two distinct mental, moral, and
physical states. In the primary, he was docile and intelligent,
while sensibility and movement were normal. In the secondary,
he was violent, vicious, less intelligent, and presented hysterical
contractures. Each state was completely independent of the
other and possessed absolutely distinct memories.—" The Life
History of a Case of Double or Multiple Personality," by A. T.
Myers, M.D. (Journal of Medical Science, January, 1896); " Les
Variations de la personnalite," par MM. Bourru et Burot (Hevue
de I'Hypnotisme, 1887, p. 193).
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Dr. Eieger (Der Hypnotismus, 1884, pp. 109-115) cites a case
of frequently recurring attacks of secondary consciousness in an
epileptic. In the normal condition his character was orderly, but
this state alternated with others during which he would leave his
home for weeks at a time and lead the life of a thief and vagabond,
sometimes being sent to prison, sometimes to asylums. In his
primary condition, he had no memory of the acts for which he had
been punished.
Dr. Lewis C. Bruce (BEAIN) gives an account of an asylum
patient who not only showed two separate and distinct states of
consciousness, but in whom the right and left brain alternately
exerted a preponderating influence over the motor functions. At
one time he was ambidextrous and only understood English, at
another he was left-handed and spoke Welsh.
Spontaneous somnambulism affords another example of
the action of a secondary consciousness. In volition and
consciousness are to be found the main differences between
it and induced somnambulism. The hypnotic subject knows
what he is doing and why he does it, and can reject dis-
agreeable suggestions. Unless specially trained, he usually
only acts in response to influence from without—influence
more or less directly transmitted to him by the suggestions
of others. The spontaneous somnambule, on the contrary,
acts his own dreams. His hallucinations sometimes excite
criminal acts, and authentic cases are reported in which
spontaneous somnambules have committed murder, under
the delusion that the person they attacked was a wild beast
or a burglar. Spontaneous somnambulism, properly speak-
ing, is a neurosis, and, as Hack Tuke pointed out, in its
severest forms approaches perilously near epilepsy, while the
condition of mental automatism which sometimes succeeds
epileptic fits closely resembles that of the sleep-walker.
Yellowlees looks upon spontaneous somnambulism as a
form of insanity, and calls it somnomania. He holds that
the sole difference between it and insanity or epileptic
violence is that it occurs during sleep, and involves only a
temporary arrest of volition, instead of the more prolonged
loss of control which results from organic mischief.
In another group of cases the secondary state, while
markedly inferior to that particular individual's primary one,
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finds its counterpart in degenerate states which are not
necessarily insane.
Of this the following case, recorded by "Dagonet" (G. E.
Sims) in the Referee, January 31, 1897, is an example :—One
night Mr. Sims received a message from the master of a work-
house, to the effect that the police had brought a man to the
infirmary whom they had found insensible in the street, ap-
parently suffering from drink ; a letter, signed by Mr. Sims, was
in his pocket. Mr. Sims knew him as a professional man in a
good position. Next day he was conscious, but absolutely denied
his identity. He said he was a street musician, and that his
cornet had been stolen during a row in a public house where he
was playing. He returned to his lodgings as soon as he was dis-
charged from the infirmary, and told his landlady he thought he
must have had a fit and fallen down in the street, for he was
bruised and ached all over, but did not remember anything about
it. Exclusive of the time passed in the infirmary, he had been
absent from his lodgings a week, but maintained that he had only
left the house that morning. A few days later he fulfilled an
important professional engagement. All went well for some time,
then he again suddenly disappeared. Search was made for him,
and he was eventually found playing a cornet outside a public
house in Camden Town. Addressed by his proper name he made
no sign, and when questioned asserted that he had been an itine-
rant musician for the last fifteen years. To-day Mr. is again
living an ordinary respectable professional life, and has not the
slightest knowledge of his periodical lapses into another indi-
viduality—that of a street musician. His name is well known to
all who are familiar with music and the drama.
In another group, the secondary state, instead of being
one of obvious mental disorder, differs little in intelligence
and volition from the primary one. The following are
examples :—
Ansel Bourne, an itinerant preacher, aged 61, residing at
Greene, Ehode Island, suddenly disappeared. In spite of the
publicity which the newspapers gave to the fact, and the efforts
of the police to find him, he remained undiscovered for two
months. He then found himself at Norristown, Pennsylvania,
where for the previous six weeks he had been keeping a small
variety store under the name of A. J. Brown, appearing to his
neighbours and customers as a normal person. When his normal
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consciousness returned, he was extremely alarmed to find himself
in an unknown situation, with absolutely no memory of his sur-
roundings, or of the incidents which had taken place from the date
of his disappearance.—Proceedings of the Society for Psychical
Research, 1891, p. 221.
Emile X., barrister, sometimes passed, without loss of con-
sciousness, into a secondary condition, which lasted from a few
minutes to several days. During it he led an active life, which
apparently did not differ from his normal one. The state always
terminated suddenly, and the ordinary consciousness retained no
recollection of what had just passed. After one attack, which
lasted three weeks, he came to himself a hundred miles from
home.—Dr. Proust, Professor of Hygiene at the Hotel Dieu, Paris.
Revue de I'Hypnotisme, March, 1890.
Mr. N., aged 32, educated, consulted Forel and told him the
following story. He stated that he had been living for some
weeks in Zurich, and had vague recollections of arriving there
after a long voyage. Recently he had read two newspaper notices
describing the sudden disappearance from Australia of a Mr. N.,
and he felt that he was the person referred to, although at the
same time it seemed impossible that this could be true. N.
entered the Burgholzli Asylum for treatment and was hypnotised
by Porel, who succeeded in restoring his lost memory by sugges-
tion, and thus obtained an account of his doings from the time he
had left Australia. There was no reason, pecuniary or moral, for
N.'s disappearance. He recovered under Forel's treatment.—
Ein Fall von tempordner, totaler, theiliveise retrograder Amnesie
(durch Suggestion geheilt), von M. Naef, Voluntararzt an der
Heilanstalt Burgholzli. Zeitschrift fur Hypnotismus, 1897,
p. 321.
The following is the most recent example I have been able to
trace of the group we are considering:—On ,April 16, 1900,
George Eidderband, aged 19, a law student and the son of a well-
known lawyer, suddenly disappeared from his home in New York.
No reason, except that he had been studying hard for an exam-
ination, was discovered for this, either at the time or afterwards.
His parents put the matter in the hands of the police. On April
21 the lad walked into a police station and told the following
story :—Five days previously, he suddenly found himself walking
in the street, but neither knew who, nor where he was, nor could
he recall anything as to his past life. Since then he had been
wandering about, struggling in vain to revive his lost memories,
keeping meanwhile a diary of his proceedings. He asked if any-
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one corresponding to him had been advertised as missing, and the
sergeant recognised him as the lost George Eidderband. He was
taken home and placed under medical care. At first he did not
recognise any of his relatives, but a week later his memory com-
menced to return ; he was still, however, unable to account in any
way for his disappearance.
In another group the secondary state, from a physical,
moral and intellectual point of view, is superior to that of
the primary one. The following are examples :—
A girl, aged ]8, healthy, but quiet and somewhat stupid in
character, swallowed some unguentum lyttae. After the acute
symptoms of poisoning passed off, a cutaneous hyperaesthesia of
the head and morbid sensitiveness to sound remained. She had
frequent attacks of temporary insensibility and passed alternately
from her ordinary mental condition to a secondary one, and from
this in its turn back again to the normal one. In the secondary
state she was excitable ; her conversation was lively and spirited,
and she was intellectually superior to what she was in the
primary condition. The memories of the two states were abso-
lutely distinct; the primary self knew nothing of the secondary
one, the secondary self nothing of the primary one.—" Case of
Double Consciousness," by Thomas Mayo, M.D., F.E.C.S.,
London Medical Gazette, New Series, Vol. I., 1845, p. 1202.
Mary Eeynolds, a dull and melancholy young woman, was
found one morning in a profound sleep, from which it was im-
possible to arouse her. After twenty hours she awoke, but her
disposition was absolutely changed and she had no memory of
her past. She was now cheerful, buoyant, sociable and merry,
but did not recognise her relatives or friends, and had lost the
power of reading and writing. Five weeks later, she passed into
the primary state; again became dull and melancholy, and re-
membered nothing of her secondary condition. After the lapse
of a few more weeks she again passed into the secondary stage
after a profound sleep, and took up her new life precisely where
she had left it. The memories of the two states were absolutely
distinct; in the first she remembered former primary states, but
these alone, in the second, she only remembered former secondary
states. These alternations of consciousness continued for fifteen
years, then finally ceased, leaving her permanently in the second
state. In this she remained without change for the last twenty-
five years of her life.—" Case of Mary Eeynolds," by Dr. Weir
Mitchell. Trans, of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia,
April 4, 1888.
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Felida X., aged 14J, without known cause, though sometimes
under the influence of emotion, had attacks of sharp pain in both
temples, followed by a state of profound stupor, which lasted ten
minutes. She then spontaneously opened her eyes and appeared
to wake, but in reality passed into a condition of secondary con-
sciousness. This lasted for an hour or two, then the stupor and
sleep re-appeared and she passed into her ordinary state. The
secondary state differed markedly from the primary one. In the
latter she was a miserable, querulous, hysterical invalid, and
remembered nothing of her secondary life, which was superior,
both intellectually and physically, to her primary one. In it
she was gay, active and intelligent, and remembered not only all
the events which had taken place in former attacks of secondary
consciousness, but also those of normal life. As time went on
the frequency of the secondary attacks became greater and their
duration longer, till at the age of 24 they commenced to exceed
the periods of normal life. From 24 to 27 she remained in the
normal state. After this the secondary attacks became more and
more frequent, and finally almost completely occupied her entire
existence. In 1875 Felida, who was then 32 years of age, told
Azam that she still suffered from attacks associated with loss of
memory. These so-called " attacks," however, were simply
lapses from her secondary consciousness into her original primary
one. Thus, once when returning from a funeral she felt her
attack, i.e., her normal state, come on. She became unconscious
for a few seconds, without her companions noticing it, then woke
in the primary state, absolutely ignorant of the reason for which
she was in a mourning carriage. Accustomed to these accidents
she waited till, by skilful questions, she was able to grasp the
situation, and thus none of those present knew what had hap-
pened. Later, she lost her sister-in-law after a long illness, and,
during a relapse into the normal state, knew nothing about her
death, and only guessed at it from the fact that she was in
mourning. In the earlier periods the transition from one state
to another was marked by a period of more or less prolonged
unconsciousness. As time went on, this diminished and, finally,
the loss of consciousness became so brief that Felida was able to
disguise it. In 1887, when Azam published the account of the
case, Felida was 44 years of age and her lapses into normal life
had become more and more rare.—Hypnotisme double Con-
science et Alterations de la Personnalite, par le Dr. Azam.
Paris, 1887, J. B. Balliere efc Fils.
In 1888 Dr. Ladame, of Geneva, communicated a somewhat
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analogous case to the Soci6t6 M^dico-Psychologique, which had
been cured by suggestion.
In the cases just cited, the first attack of secondary
consciousness was frequently preceded by shock, although
sometimes it arose without apparent exciting cause. In
subsequent ones it was usually more difficult to trace the
exciting cause; generally the attacks were independent of
the patient's volition, although cases are recorded by
McNish and others where the state could be induced at
will.
The attacks of secondary consciousness usually terminated
spontaneously, and without discoverable cause. In some
instances, however, the accidental reading of an account
of their losb selves seems to have evoked some of the
memories of the primary state and contributed to the
disappearance of the secondary one.
(b) Facts in support of a secondary consciousness drawn
from normal waking or sleeping life.—Here the evidence is
not so clear as in the preceding section, but without the
hypothesis of a secondary consciousness, it is difficult to
explain phenomena such as the following:—
(1) Time appreciation in cases such as those of Savage
and Hartog. Here, no ordinary physiological explanation is
possible, and, while the ordinary consciousness was asleep,
an intelligence of some kind must have watched the passage
of time.
(2) The recollection of forgotten facts without the
association of ideas connected with normal memory.
Everyone, I think, must recall instances in which he has
tried to remember a forgotten name, and, after having failed
to recall it by every device imaginable, at last put the
problem on one side in disgust and turned his attention to
other things. Later, the forgotten name rises into con-
sciousness, with a suddenness which is startling, and no
association of ideas can be discovered to account for its
appearance.
(3) Literary problems, which are vainly struggled with
when awake, are sometimes apparently solved in sleep.
Thus, on awaking, page after page is easily and satisfactorily
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written, while the day before the author had been unable to
find expression for his thoughts.
(4) According to Myers, works of genius, instead of being
the result of an infinite capacity for taking trouble, are due
to the intelligent action of a secondary consciousness. The
labour is performed in a subterranean workshop, as it were,
and then presented in completed form to the normal con-
sciousness. The latter not only believes that it has done
the work itself, but thinks that this has been performed
instantaneously.
(c) Hypnotic phenomena which apparently support the
theory of a secondary consciousness.—These are too numerous
to be referred to in detail, and it might even be claimed that
every deeply hypnotised subject shows evidence—in memory
changes alone—of the existence of a secondary conscious-
ness. In the waking state, he can recall nothing of what has
passed in profound hypnosis, but when hypnotised, not only
remembers the events of previous hypnoses, but also all that
his ordinary memory can recall of waking life and even, in
addition, much that it had forgotten. Further, he has
acquired a control over his own mind and body without
parallel in waking life. He can alter the rhythm of his
pulse, control his secretions and excretions, and increase or
arrest the activity of his special senses. He can induce
anaesthesia and analgesia, and, even when all the phenomena
are elicited by the suggestion of the operator who has
hypnotised him, maintain consciousness and volition un-
impaired. From the therapeutic side he can obtain relief
from the pain of disease or injury, procure sleep at will and
for as long or as short a time as he wishes. He can escape
from obsessions, conquer the diseased craving for alcohol
and narcotics, and get rid of numerous functional nervous
disturbances. Finally, he can be taught to hypnotise him-
self, and from henceforth—free from all external interference
—can by self-suggestion produce phenomena identical with
those just described. All these phenomena cannot be evoked
in every case, but something can always be effected beyond
the power of the waking will.
The following is an interesting example of the spontaneous
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and intelligent action of the secondary consciousness in an
untrained hypnotic subject. I questioned Miss A. (the
subject of the time experiments above referred to) during
hypnosis, as to her mental life in previous hypnoses. She
replied as follows:—" When you do not speak to me and
nothing occurs that interests me directly, I generally think
of nothing and pass into a condition of profound restfulness.
Once, however, I had an important dress to make and was
puzzled how to do it. After you had hypnotised me and
left me resting quietly, I planned the dress. When I awoke,
I did not know I had done so and was still troubled
about it. On my way home, I suddenly thought how the
dress ought to be made and afterwards successfully carried
out my ideas. I believed I had found the way out of the
difficulty there and then in the waking state, I now know
I did so some hours previously when hypnotised." When
the subject was aroused, she had no recollection of what she
had said and still believed she had planned the dress when
awake. The origin of this feat in dressmaking—one appa-
rently beyond the subject's normal powers—may be taken
as illustrating the possible source of the higher intellectual
achievements of genius.
Finally, there is evidence which shows, not only that
there is a secondary consciousness which alternates with the
primary one, but also that the two may act simultaneously
and independently of each other. This is clearly demon-
strated by the phenomenon of automatic writing.
Automatic Writing.
In choosing a subject for automatic writing two things
are essential, viz.: (1) he must be a somnambule, i.e., retain
no memory on waking of what has passed in the hypnotic
state, and (2) hypnosis must be capable of being induced
and terminated instantaneously. Thus, when the subject
is aroused immediately after the suggestion has been given,
the problem must be solved in the waking state, although,
as we shall see, not by the waking consciousness.
I have often made the following and similar experiments.
 by guest on June 7, 2016
http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
208 ORIGINAL ARTICLES AND CLINICAL CASES
I ask a subject while awake to write down a few verses;
these I take charge of and do not show him again. I then
make him read aloud from some book previously unknown
to him, this being chosen in order to engage his entire
attention. While reading I hypnotise him suddenly, place
pencil and paper near his right hand, and suggest: " On
waking you will go on reading where you left off, and at the
same time write down how often b (or any other letter
selected) occurs in the verses you gave me. Wake up."
He wakes, resumes reading, and at the same time writes
down the answer to the problem suggested. This, almost
invariably correct, is often done so rapidly that I have not
had time to count the letters, even with the verses before
me. I now tell the subject to stop reading, and ask him
what he has written. He replies, " Nothing," and when
I show him the paper, is astonished and declares he does
not know what it means. I then re-hypnotise him, where-
upon the lost memory returns, and he not only recalls the
suggestion, but also the fact that he has carried it out.
Thus, the primary waking consciousness retains no
recollection of the hypnotic suggestions. It does not know
that the secondary consciousness, after the hypnotic state
has been terminated, first solves the problems, and then
directs the motor acts which record them. It is also
unconscious of the motor acts themselves.
Gurney made many interesting experiments with healthy
non-hysterical men, which illustrate the severance of the
normal, or primary, from the latent, or secondary, conscious-
ness. Of these the following are examples :—(1) The first
were simple cases which involved memory, but not in-
dependent thought. Thus, Gurney showed P., one of his
subjects, a planchette and made him write his name with it.
P. was then hypnotised; told that it had been as dark as
night in London on the previous day, and that he would
record this fact in writing. On awaking he remembered
nothing. His hand was then placed on the planchette—
a large screen being held in front of his face, so that it was
impossible for him to see the paper or the instrument—and
in Jess than a minute he wrote, " It was a dark day in
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London yesterday." (2) In the next experiments state-
ments were impressed on the subjects, but nothing was said
as to subsequently recording them. After waking, however,
the writing was executed as before. (3) Gurney made more
complicated experiments with another subject. During
hypnosis questions were asked about his past life, or arith-
metical problems suggested. He was then awakened imme-
diately, before he had time to think of a reply, and, to engross
his attention, told to count backwards from a hundred;
meanwhile the planchette wrote the correct solutions of the
problems. (4) Further experiments involved the reckoning
of time. These, however, were not confined to the execution
of an order at a given moment, but involved, in addition,
other calculations made in the waking state at a suddenly
selected moment, regarding which nothing had been previously
said to the subject. For instance, during hypnosis, he was
told to do something at a given date, and also that, before
this time arrived, he would be required to write down the
number of minutes that had passed since the suggestion was
given, as well as the number that had to elapse before its
fulfilment. In the interval, when his hand was placed upon
the planchette, he generally wrote the answers to the
problems. The results, allowing for the time occupied in
writing, were remarkably accurate.
Remarks.
The experiments in groups Nos. 3 and 4 showed, accord-
ing to Gurney, that the hypnotic substrata included higher
physical functions than mere random spurts of memory,
viz., processes of deliberate reckoning and reflection, which
it would be almost impossible to conceive as having only a
physiological existence. In group 4, the order itself was
remembered and realised by the secondary consciousness,
while the primary consciousness was wholly without know-
ledge of it. In Gurney's opinion, these so-called automatic
writings were, in most cases at all events, intelligent and
involved mentation. When a statement was made which
the subject was told he was afterwards to record in writing,
the performance might possibly be regarded as an exclusively
VOL. XXIII. 14
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automatic one, due to a " setting of the organism." Some-
times, however, the impression was made without a hint as
to the future—without the faintest suggestion that it would
produce any result whatever; yet, in the midst of quite
irrelevant surroundings and experiences, the phenomenon
appeared as soon as the opportunity of " automatic " repre-
sentation arose. Here the organism could not have been
specially set for the effect. Eurther, if we regarded the
action as purely automatic, we should be compelled to
concede a singular power to hypnotic impressions, viz.,
that of storing up energy in the brain which would work
mechanically outwards along the motor nerves, as soon as
the act of writing was sufficiently easy for the muscles.
Moreover, memory on re-hypnotisation afforded strong evi-
dence of mentation. Not only did the subject remember the
original idea conveyed to him, and the fact that he had
written something, but also the exact words he had used to
convey his conception of the impression. Surely this indi-
cated an intelligent apprehension of the words. We have
seen that the memory of these so-called automatic acts
could be recalled in hypnosis, but some of them, in addition,
indicated the existence of a hypnotic memory superior to the
normal one, as the facts recorded had occurred at an early
period of the subject's life and had long been forgotten.
(II.) Granting the existence of a secondary consciousness,
how far does this explain all the phenomena we have
been considering ?
The facts just citedj—and these might be supplemented
by many more — apparently indicate not only that a
secondary consciousness exists, but also that it can act
simultaneously with, and independently of, the primary one.
Even, however, if we grant the existence of a secondary
consciousness, this does not explain all the phenomena of
time appreciation and arithmetical calculation that we have
been considering.
Obviously if the intelligence of the secondary conscious-
ness were at all comparable to that of the primary one, it
would not be difficult for it to calculate the arrival of the
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39th or the 123rd day from any given date. In Gurney's
cases, it apparently performed this feat with ease, and the
subject, when hypnotised, could recall the manner in which
it had been accomplished.
Here the secondary consciousness apparently acted in
just the same way as the primary one might have done
under similar circumstances; having to execute an order on
the 39th day from a given date, it recalled the fact from time
to time and noted how many days had passed and how many
had to come. Many of the experiments I have cited, notably
the more complicated ones executed by Miss A., present
more difficult problems, and by none of the theories already
considered can these be properly solved. Bernheim's
explanation, as we have seen, is in opposition to observed
facts, while Gurney's objections to that of Beaunis apply
with even greater force to my cases. Thus, if there is little
analogy between ordinary physiological periods of time, and,
for example, 39 days chosen suddenly and arbitrarily by
human volition, the analogy is still less between the former
and, say, 20,845 minutes.
Further, the secondary consciousness theory, while it
affords a reasonable explanation of the way in which Gurney's
subjects carried out their suggestions, fails to account for
much that is important in the cases I have cited. The
following are the principal points which demand explana-
tion :—(1) The want of hypnotic memory as to the manner
in which the suggestions were carried out. (2) The fact
that the suggestions not only involved feats of arithmetical
calculation and memory far beyond the subject's normal
powers, but also in some cases beyond their hypnotic ones.
(3) The difference in the nature of the time appreciation
required in Gurney's cases and in those cited by me.
(1) The want of hypnotic memory as to the manner in
which the suggestions were carried out.
According to Bernheim, the hypnotic subject is conscious
in all stages, and all the memories of hypnotic life, which
are lost on waking, can be restored by suggestion or other
means. This statement is not absolutely correct. Hypnotic
life, it is true, is more conscious than the normal one,
 by guest on June 7, 2016
http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
212 OEIGINAL ABTICLES AND CLINICAL CASES
and lacks the prolonged and regularly recurring periods of
unconsciousness, represented in the latter by sleep. Some-
times, however, deeply hypnotised subjects receive impres-
sions, and even perform acts, of which they are unconscious.
Thus, (a) where anaesthesia has been induced for surgical
purposes, the subjects can recall nothing of the operations,
either when awake or in subsequent hypnoses. Generally
speaking, present forgetfulness does not prove past uncon-
sciousness. When we find, however—in the instances
where analgesia and hypersesthesia have been simultane-
ously excited—amnesia as to certain sensations, associated
with hyperaesthesia as to others, we have reasonable grounds
for inferring that the sensations, which cannot be recalled,
never reached consciousness. This view is further strength-
ened by the fact that the operations were characterised by
absence of shock, persistence of analgesia after waking and
unusual rapidity in the healing process.
(b) If a subject is told to be unconscious of everything
until aroused by the operator, he will, if neither questioned
nor touched, take no notice of what is said or done around
him, while suggestion, in subsequent hypnoses, often fails to
revive any memory of what has taken place.
(c) If a simple movement is suggested, of which volition
does not disapprove, it may after a time become automatic,
i.e., after having been frequently consciously and voluntarily
performed, it may be executed unconsciously, as a genuine
automatic act, in response to the habitual stimulus which
has excited it. Here, again, the lost memory cannot be
recalled by suggestion in subsequent hypnoses.
With the exception of examples of the three classes just
cited, the acts of hypnotic life are performed consciously
and can be recalled by suggestion in subsequent hypnoses.
Further, as the hypnotic memory is more exact and far-
reaching than the normal one, the absence of memory as
to some given circumstances of hypnotic life, other than
those just cited, is markedly suspicious. These suspicions
are deepened when the forgotten act is analogous to those
invariably remembered by the hypnotised subject. Gurney's
subjects easily remembered their calculations as to the days
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that had passed, those that had to come and the terminal
time of the experiment. In some instances, when the
arithmetical problems involved were simple, Miss B., in
subsequent hypnosis, recalled the fact that she had cal-
culated out the terminal time of the suggestions and set
herself to carry it out at the appointed hour. This, by the
way, Gurney asserted hypnotised subjects never did. When
the experiments became more complicated, Miss B. ceased to
do this, and then, like Miss A., was unable to revive in
hypnosis the slightest trace of memory, as to the manner in
which the suggestions had been carried out—they could
then recall no calculations and no time watching, no fore-
telling of the terminal time and no recognition of it when it
arrived. Yet, from what we know of hypnotic memory,
it is impossible to doubt that if calculations and observations
of this kind had been made by the subject, they would have
been able to have remembered them when again hypnotised.
(2) The fact that the suggestions not onhj involved feats
of arithmetical calculation and memory beyond the subject's
normal powers, but also in some cases beyond their hypnotic
ones.
Delboeuf pointed out that his subjects, in the normal
state, were unable to make the necessary calculations in-
volved in his time experiments; therefore the success of
these experiments, he said, demonstrated that the subjects
when hypnotised had an idea of the passage of time, and
unconsciously calculated when the suggestions fell due.
Experiments made in hypnosis, however, showed that the
subject was quite incapable of calculating even much simpler
problems than those involved, and, although this fact was
recorded by Delboeuf himself, he apparently missed its
significance. When Miss A. was asked to calculate in
hypnosis when the suggestions fell due, she was wrong in
the first nine instances, her errors frequently being extremely
gross ones. Again, unless specially asked to do so, the
secondary consciousness apparently made no calculations at
all. The time appreciation, however, could not be carried
out independently of such calculations, obviously the subject
could not perform an act at the expiration of 40,845 minutes
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unless she—or some self, or consciousness, within her—
knew the terminal time this represented.
Further, in Miss A.'s case the hypnotic memory was
apparently incapable of retaining the complicated series of
figures which were read to her. When she was questioned
about them in subsequent hypnosis, but before the fulfil-
ment of the suggestions, she always recalled that the latter
had been made, but rarely correctly remembered their details
—her recollection being less and less distinct in proportion
to the time which had elapsed since they had been received.
(3) The difference in the nature of the time appreciation
required in Gurney's case and in those cited by me.
There is a marked difference between the recognition
of a particular day on its arrival and the last minute in
such a series as 20,845. A secondary self or intelligence,
which can count the days that have passed and those
that have to come and refreshes its memory by doing this
every night, could have no difficulty in recognising the
terminal day. The varying impressions from the external
world, which tell us that a new day has dawned, would
be received as freely by the secondary as by the primary
consciousness, and all that the former would have to do
would be to associate them with the calculation it had made
the night before, that the next day would be the suggested
one. In my cases the problem is a widely different one.
Granting that some intelligence worked out the arithmetical
portion, and determined that the suggestion fell due, for
example, at 3.25 p.m. a fortnight later, the determina-
tion of the arrival of 3.25 differs widely from the recog-
nition of the dawning of a particular day. Admitting
that some intelligence, equal to the primary one, tried to
determine when this moment arrived, circumstances, often
specially arranged, added to the difficulties of the task. In
some instances, for example, Miss A. was in a darkened
room for several hours before the suggestion was executed,
and absolutely without any of the ordinary methods of
determining the time. Even if she knew what o'clock it
was when she entered the room at noon, how could she
determine when it was 3.25 ?
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The general conditions of memory, then, in reference to
the experiments I have cited, apparently show that the
secondary consciousness—or at all events such manifesta-
tions of it as Gurney describes—did not participate in them
at all. Further, the feats in calculation and memory were
beyond the power of that consciousness, while we have no
evidence of the secondary consciousness carrying out time
appreciations comparable to the particular cases involved.
Some intelligence, however, must have made the arithmeti-
cal calculations, and, further, corrected them when they
were erroneously worked out by the secondary consciousness.
Something also must have remembered the complicated series
of figures and the varying results of the calculations, and also,
in some fashion, noticed the time as it passed and connected
this with the date given as the result of the calculations
involved in the suggestions. Could the problems have been
worked out by a third consciousness acting independently of
the primary one ? The theory that a multiple, as well as a
secondary, consciousness exists is not a new one, although,
as far as I know, it has not yet done duty in explaining the
phenomena of time appreciation. I propose now to examine
some of the alleged cases of multiple consciousness, and
later to see what light, if any, they throw upon the problems
we have been considering.
CASES OP SO-CALLED MULTIPLE CONSCIOUSNESS.
Sarah L. was the first person in whom I found any
evidence of so-called multiple personalities, and when she
came under my notice about ten years ago I knew nothing
of the literature on the subject. In the normal state she
was quiet, respectful and somewhat shy, and retained this
character when I hypnotised her. She was a profound sorn-
nambule; in the waking life she knew nothing of the events
of hypnosis, but in hypnosis could recall all the memories of
the normal state as well as the incidents of hypnotic life.
In 1889, the late Mr. Bendelack Hewetson, of Leeds,
operated on her for double strabismus, the only anaesthetic
employed being hypnotic suggestion. Later, she sustained a
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severe fracture of the nose; there was a good deal of dis-
placement and the parts were swollen and extremely painful.
Profound anaesthesia was again induced by suggestion and
the bones moulded into position; in each instance the occur-
rence of subsequent pain was entirely prevented by sugges-
tion. Further, the patient was also cured of attacks of
migraine, from which she had suffered since the age of 7,
while, after fifteen months' amenorrhoea, menstruation ap-
peared at a suggested date. The above details are cited in
order to show the genuine and profound character of the
hypnosis.
Before coming under my care Sarah L. had been hypno-
tised and exhibited by a stage performer, and, some time
after the events just recorded, her mother told me that Sarah
occasionally hypnotised herself, and that the condition then
differed markedly from the one I induced. After some
coaxing the girl consented to hypnotise herself, and went
through the following performance : —First, she closed her
eyes and appeared to pass into a lethargic state, then, a few
minutes later, awoke with a changed expression ; instead of
having a shy and modest air, her eyes sparkled and she
looked full of mischief. In place of addressing me as " Sir "
—she had- formerly been a servant of mine, and an ex-
tremely respectful one—she put her hand on my arm and
said in a familiar way, " I say?" She then began to ask
me impertinent questions about the persons she had seen at
my house, and to criticise them in a particularly free and
sarcastic fashion. The performance was so interesting and
amusing that I got the patient to hypnotise herself on a
good many occasions. The same phenomena always ap-
peared ; she invariably became familiar, inquisitive and sar-
castic, while her highest praise for anyone she approved of
was conveyed in the words, " She'll do." Other facts were
noticed and reported to me by her mother. Thus, some-
times when Sarah hypnotised herself, she would remember
that her mother owed her a few coppers and insist upon
having them at once. If they were refused, she would take
them by force; to this, however, her mother lent herself.
The girl would then generally go out and buy oranges, and,
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on her return, eat them all herself; this selfishness was
quite out of keeping with her normal character. Sometimes,
when her mother asked her to do work that was distasteful
to her, such as blacking the grate, she would induce self-
hypnosis with profound lethargy and remain apparently
deeply asleep for hours. I never taught her to hypnotise
herself, nor, as far as I could learn, had this been done by
anyone else. During this third stage she remembered every-
thing that had happened in previous conditions of this kind,
and also the events of the normal state and those of ordinary
hypnosis, but the waking consciousness and the ordinary
hypnotic one knew nothing of the events of this third state.
After I had observed the condition for some time, I con-
cluded that it was not likely to be beneficial to the patient,
and suggested, during ordinary hypnosis, that she should
lose the power of creating it. The suggestion was successful
and the condition never reappeared.
Pierre Janet has been fortunate in finding several
patients who apparently possess multiplex personalities,
and has published full and interesting accounts of their
cases. Amongst these that of Leonie is, I think, one
of the most striking. This patient, aged 45, apparently
possessed three distinct and well-markea personalities, viz.,
Leonie I . ; the Leonie of normal life, a serious and sad
peasant woman, calm, slow, gentle and timid. Leonie I I . ;
Leonie in the ordinary hypnotic state, a gay, noisy, restless
being, given to irony and bitter jesting, who describes her
visitors in an impertinent fashion and apes their airs and
graces. Leonie II. refuses to identify herself with Leonie
I., and calls the latter a stupid woman. Leonie has had
attacks of natural somnambulism since she was three years
old, and from 16 upwards has been frequently hypnotised
by various people. Now, when Leonie II. is called to the
front, she knits together the events of her natural and in-
duced hypnotic state and forms the history of her life from
them; the memories of waking life are not forgotten, but
these are ascribed to Leonie I.
When Leonie II. is hypnotised more deeply there appears
a third personality, Leonie III., who is grave, serious,
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slow in speech and movement. This Leonie separates
herself both from Leonie I. of waking life and the Leonie
II. of the ordinary hypnotic state. The former she describes
as a good, but rather stupid woman, and the latter as crazy.
"Fortunately," she says, " there is nothing of me in either
of them." Leonie I. knows herself alone ; Leonie II. her-
self and Leonie I., while Leonie III. not only knows herself
but also the two others. Leonie I. has only a visual con-
sciousness ; Leonie II. has both visual and auditory, while
Leonie III. has a visual, auditory and tactile one. Leonie
I. is embarassed and ashamed when Leonie II.'s friends,
who are strangers to her, speak to her in the street. Leonie
II. spontaneously writes letters, which Leonie I. finds and
destroys, as she does not understand them. Afterwards
Leonie II. hides her letters where she knows Leonie I. will
never look for them. Leonie II. visits places where Leonie
I. has never been, then disappears and pushes Leonie I. to
the front, leaving her frightened by her strange surroundings.
According to Janet these three personalities, which deny
and despise each other, not only existed in successive forms,
but did so simultaneously. While Leonie I., for example,
is apparently the only Leonie, other personalities are inside
of the same woman, each of them sensible and wide awake
and occupied with her own affairs.
In " An Experimental Study of Visions " (BBAIN, 1898)
Dr. Morton Prince records some interesting experiments
which he made with Miss X., a patient who suffered from
hysterical neurasthenia. Miss X. was easily hypnotised
and at first passed into the ordinary deep stage, then,
when ordered to sleep more profoundly, a fresh condition
developed, which differed both from that of waking life and
ordinary hypnosis. According to Dr. Prince those stages
formed three distinct personalities, viz.: —
X. I. The Miss X. of ordinary waking life, who is
reserved, morbidly conscientious, self-contained, serious,
deferential and dignified.
X. II. The Miss X. of the primary hypnotic condition,
who is sad, serious, and apparently weak and suffering.
X. III. The Miss X. of the secondary or deeper hypnotic
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state, who is flippant and jovial, free from all physical in-
firmities, full of fun and reckless.
X. I. remembers the events of waking life alone and
knows nothing of X. II . and X. III., while X. II. re-
members all that has passed in previous primary hypnotic
states, also all that X. I. can recall, and, in addition, some
other events of waking life which X. I. has forgotten.
X. III. remembers all the events of the secondary or
deeper hypnotic stages, as well as everything X. I. and
X. II. can recall. In addition, she can describe incidents
in the past life of X. I. which are lost to the memory of
the latter, and can thus explain much that the waking
personality is at a loss to account for. She knows all about
many of the little absent-minded doings of X. I., and does
not hesitate to voluntarily tell of them, although X. I. is
morbidly and unnecessarily reserved about her whole life.
Dr. Prince made this tripartite personage look into a
globe, which took the place of the ordinary glass ball used
in crystal gazing, and describes the visions which the
different personages saw. The following is one of the most
interesting of these :—
X. III . was the person in action and voluntarily related
the following incident, telling it with great gusto as a joke
against Miss X. (X. I.), whom she talked of as " She."
" ' She' received a letter from a photographer yesterday.
' She' put it into her pocket where ' She ' had some bank-
notes. Then, as ' She ' walked along, ' She ' took out the
money and tore it to pieces, thinking it was the letter.
' She' threw the money into the street." In response to
questioning X. III. repeated the words of the photographer's
note and counted mentally, with some difficulty and concen-
tration of thought, the amount of money. X. III. said that
" She" was absent-minded and thinking of something else
when " She" tore up the money. Hypnosis was now
terminated and the ordinary personality, X. I., appeared,
who, in reply to questions, stated that she had received a
letter from her photographer which she had torn up, and
that she had the bank-notes in her pocket. She was asked
to show them and produced the letter. This surprised her,
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but she thought she must have left the bank-notes at home,
and could not believe she had destroyed them. The notes
were undoubtedly lost, and an account of the occurrence,
similar to that given by X. III., was obtained by making
Miss X. (X. I.) look into the globe and suggesting that she
should see what had really happened. Here, apparently,
the ordinary hypnotic state, namely, X. II., was induced by
indirect suggestion and fixed gazing, and the vision appeared
in response to the suggestions of the operator.
Crystal gazing, the method employed by Dr. Prince, is
not really necessary for the production of hypnotic visions ;
it simply acts by presenting a point upon which the
suggested memories are concentrated, and rendered, as it
were, objective. Any memory which exists in the hypnotic
consciousness can be evoked by suggestion without the
crystal. Under ordinary circumstances the hypnotic sub-
ject rarely visualises his memories, but when he looks into
the crystal this is a direct suggestion that he should see with
his eyes what has happened. I have frequently made
similar experiments with hypnotic subjects, and, in place of
the crystal, made them look at the top of my stethoscope,
which answered equally well.
The following account is condensed from the notes
kindly supplied me by Dr. Albert Wilson, of Leytonstone.
Mary W., born October, 1882, had in April, 1895, an
attack of meningitis associated with influenza. During the
third and fourth weeks of the illness there was high tempera-
ture, with delirium bordering on mania, and she called
people snakes and did not recognise her friends. In the
fifth week, during convalescence, her character changed, and
she began to give those around her names which were not
their own—thus, her father was Tom, her mother Mary Ann,
&c. About the sixth week attacks of secondary personality
appeared. The patient would suddenly turn a somersault
on the bed and then assume a new character—returning
suddenly to the normal, and resuming what she had been
occupied with before the attack. At first the seizures
lasted from ten to fifty minutes, but increased to hours, days
and weeks as the time went on. The secondary self knew
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nothing of the primary one and vice versa,; further, the
secondary self had apparently lost much of the knowledge
the primary one had acquired. Thus, in the second state,
the patient did not know what her legs and arms were and
was childish in her talk. She could write her name, how-
ever, but this she did backwards, beginning at the tail of the
last letter and writing quickly from right to left—not mirror
writing.
After a few months the periods of normal life become
shorter, and in place of one secondary stage various others
showed themselves from time to time. Of these there were
sixteen in all, termed by Dr. Wilson stages a, b, c, d . . .p.
In each stage the subject remembered what had happened
during previous attacks of the same stage, but knew nothing
of what had occurred in any of the other stages, while the
primary personality remembered events in the normal life
alone, and knew nothing regarding any of the incidents
which had happened in any of the numerous other states.
At the end of a year the normal condition rarely appeared,
and then only as a flash—sometimes coming to the surface
for five or.ten minutes, sometimes only for a few seconds.
The following stages or personalities were noted, most of
them being named by the patient herself:—
(a) The patient calls herself " Thing " ; she is vacant,
knows nothing of her past life and cannot stand.
(6) Calls herself " Old Nick " and is passionate and
mischievous.
(c) Here there is catalepsy with deaf-mutism, but the
patient writes down all she wants.
(d) In this stage the patient has forgotten not only the
incidents of normal life, but apparently also much of the
general knowledge acquired during it. In writing she
spells backwards in the manner already described.
(e) A stage characterised by terror.
( / ) Here the patient calls herself " Good Thing," and is
docile, but usually without power in feet or hands; this
stage, however, is quite distinct from (a).
ig) The patient now calls herself " Pretty dear"; is
sweet and amiable, but cannot write or spell.
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(li) Calls herself " Mamie W u d " ; in this stage she
recalls the events of childhood better than when awake, but
is unable to remember anything about her illness.
(i) This stage is somewhat like (d), when in it the patient
knows nothing and thinks she is just born.
(k) Here the patient calls herself " Old Persuader," and
asks for a stick to strike people with if they won't do what
she wishes.
(I) She now calls herself "Tom's darling," and is appa-
rently a nice child.
(vi) In this stage she asserts that she has " no name,"
and is violent and unkind.
(») She now calls herself " The dreadful wicked thing " ;
throws her slippers into the fire in a temper, &c.
(o) In this stage she calls herself " Tommy's lamb," and
is blind and idiotic.
(p) In December, 1896, a further stage developed, which
lasted till February, 1897. The patient now kept saying
"picters," and drew beautifully, even being able to do so
when she was prevented from seeing the paper on which she
was drawing. The original self was unable- to draw.
During this stage the pupils were dilated and reacted feebly
to light, while the patient was apparently insensible to
sound.
As time went on, the patient, when in abnormal stages,
began to have some idea of what had taken place in her
ordinary life; when in the latter condition, however, she
still had no recollection of anything that had happened in
any of the abnormal stages. In July, 1898, she passed into
a condition much more closely resembling the normal one;
she was still, however, childish and called herself "Critter
Wood."
At the present time (Summer, 1900) five years since the
commencement of her illness, she has apparently settled
down in stage (g), but has been taught that Mary W., not
" Pretty dear," is her name. She is a fine, healthy, well-
developed girl, who helps in the house and is anxious to
learn typewriting in order to keep herself. Her character,
however, differs slightly from her original one, and she is
still somewhat childish at times.
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Gurney stated that he had experimentally demonstrated
the existence of positive and distinct stages of memory
within the conscious portion of the hypnotic trance. The
subjects of these experiments were first hypnotised lightly,
and something was told them which they were asked to
remember. Deeper hypnosis was then induced, when the
subject was asked what he had just been told ; it was found
that he neither remembered what had been related to him,
nor even the fact that he had been told anything at all.
While in this deep stage, which Gurney termed B, some
new incident was related to the subject which he was again
asked to remember. He was then recalled to the lighter
stage, termed A by Gurney, and asked to repeat what he
had been told; he had forgotten what he had heard a few
minutes before in stage B, but repeated instead what had
been told him in the earlier stage A, in which he now again
found himself. Brought once more to B, he similarly
remembered what he had been told in that state, while he
was again completely oblivious of what had been impressed
upon him in A. On waking he retained no memory of
anything that had been told him in either stage.
Many cases, of which the following is an example, were
cited by Gurney to illustrate these alterations in hypnotic
•memory:—
S., a young man living at Brighton, was told in state A,
the lighter stage of hypnotic trance, that the pier head had
been washed away, and in state B, the deeper stage of
trance, that an engine boiler had burst at Brighton station
and killed several people. He was then brought from stage
B back again to A, when he recalled all that had been
told him about the accident to the pier. Hypnosis was
again deepened; stage B appeared, and the following
conversation took place between the operator and the
subject:—
Operator : " But I suppose they will soon be able to
build a new one."
Had the pier been present in S.'s mind, this remark, said
Gurney, would naturally have been taken to refer to it, as it
had formed the subject of conversation only a few seconds
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before. S., however, at once replied : "Oh, there are plenty
on the line "—meaning plenty of engines.
Operator : " The pile-driving takes time, though."
S.: "Pile-driving? Well, I don't know anything about
engines myself."
The subject was now brought back to stage A, and the
conversation continued:—
Operator : "If they have plenty more, it does not matter
much."
S.: " Oh, they can't put it on in a day; it was a splendid
place."
Operator: " Why, I am talking about the engine."
S.: " Engine ! What, on the pier ? I never noticed one
there."
Here the subject's mind had evidently again reverted to
what had been told him in stage A.
In the above case, as in all others of a like nature cited
by Gurney, the normal self knew nothing of stages A and B,
and these knew nothing of each other.
Before considering multiple personality, in reference to
feats of calculation and time appreciation, I wish to examine
the characteristics of the various examples of secondary and
multiple personality we have been considering. The cases,
which present many different phenomena, may be grouped
as follows :—
CLASS I.—Those more or less closely associated with
morbid states, and presenting phenomena which range from
amnesiae with alterations in character, to conditions similar
to those presented by "Felida X.
CLASS II.—Cases of ordinary hypnotic somnambulism,
which afford evidence of a secondary personality.
CLASS III.—Cases of hypnotic somnambulism, presum-
ably showing evidence of multiple personality.
CLASS IV.—Time appreciation, &c, like those of George
Savage and Marcus Hartog.
CLASS V.—Instances where mental work, varying from
the recollection of a forgotten name to the so-called inspira-
tions of genius, have apparently been carried out by some
consciousness other than the ordinary one, and in some con-
dition other than hypnosis.
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CLASS I.
At the lower end of this class Hyslop, in his article on
" Double Consciousness," British Medical Journal, Septem-
ber 23, 1899, includes cases in which the patients, after a
seizure of some sort, performed certain acts of which their
ordinary consciousness was ignorant. These varied from
purposeless automatic ones to thefts committed with more
or less skill or cunning, and, apparently, were neither re-
called in the normal state nor in subsequent attacks. At
the other end of the group Hyslop cites Felida X., whose
case, already reported, differs in many respects from those
just referred to. The changes in memory, whether modifica-
tions or disturbances, are the most important phenomena in
connection with double and multiple personalities, and in
Class I. these may be grouped as follows :—
(a) Cases where purposeless automatic acts occur, re-
garding which there is no subsequent revival of memory in
any normal or abnormal state.
(b) "Where more or less intelligent acts are executed,
which again are never subsequently recalled, either in
primary or in secondary states.
(c) Here there are two or more conditions, each charac-
terised by distinct chains of memory : (1) The primary or
normal, in which the events of ordinary life alone are re-
membered, and (2) the secondary or multiple, in which the
occurrences of these states are alone recalled.
(d) Here the primary state only possesses a memory
of its own life, while the secondary has a memory of its
own life, and that of the primary one also. Further, the
secondary self can often recall much which the primary has
forgotten.
Many of the cases also differ widely in their moral and
physical aspect. Thus some of the patients, who were
gentle and good in the normal state, became violent and
criminal in the secondary one. Others changed in the
reverse fashion both morally and physically; some, like
Felida, who were ill-tempered, querulous invalids in their
ordinary condition, became bright, cheerful, good-natured,
and more intelligent in their secondary one.
VOL. XXIII. 15
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CLASS II.—Cases of ordinary hypnotic double personality.
These correspond with the subdivision (d) just given
under Class I., and the secondary self is always richer in
memories than the primary one. It is also, generally speak-
ing, healthier and more refined.
CLASS III.—Gases of hypnotic somnambulism, presumably
associated with multiplex personality.
Here varying and important changes in memory are
to be observed. In tj^pical cases we have (a) a primary
condition, which knows itself alone; (b) a secondary one,
which knows itself and the primary one; and (c) a third,
which knows itself and the other two also, and can recall,
in addition, much which has been unconscious in the
primary life, or that has been forgotten by the primary con-
sciousness. Usually, the secondary self is superior to the
primary one, morally, intellectually, and physically, while
the third, in its turn, rises above the second. Sometimes,
however, as in Dr. Prince's case, the third personality
appears like an evil sprite, who rejoices at the misfortunes of
the primary one.
In some cases, such as those cited by Gurney, the two
hypnotic selves had each a separate chain of memory and
held, as it were, no communication with each other.
In Miss A.'s case the third personality only showed
itself in its results—calculations, time appreciation, &c, and
I never succeeded in artificially tapping it for purposes of
examination. Had I been able to do so, doubtless I should
have found that it could recall the calculations, &c, which
presumably it had made. It is to be noted that the secondary
consciousness was incapable of performing the feats in
arithmetic, &c, which the tertiary one found no difficulty
in executing.
CLASS IV.—Time Appreciations, like those of George Savage
and Marcus Hartog.
Neither of these observers can trace any memory of the
process by which they arrived at their results. This, how-
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ever, does not prove unconsciousness or forgetfulness, as far
as some personality is concerned, it only shows that, as in
Miss A.'s case, we have not discovered the way of evoking
the memories. The repetition of Savage's early wakings on
subsequent unnecessary occasions, apparently showed that
he was capable of starting, but not of regulating, the
mechanism on which these depended, while Hartog appa-
rently possessed more control over his secondary self.
CLASS V.—Cases of Subconscious Performance of Mental
Work in Non-hypnotic Conditions.
Here, again, it has been impossible to revive any memory
as to the means by which the work has been done. Judging
from the analogies of hypnotic life—we may instance par-
ticularly the dressmaking experience already referred to—
it seems probable that such memories exist, and that the
secondary self knows how and when it did the work, which
the primary one natters itself it has performed.
The importance of memory in relation to subconscious
states is insisted on, both by William James and Myers.
According to the former, the theory of " double conscious-
ness " is only, after all, a development of what is found in
Locke's famous chapter on " Identity and Diversity," namely,
that personality extended no further than consciousness and
that there would be two different persons in one man, if the
experiences undergone by that man fell into two groups,
each gathered into a distinct focus of recollection. Further,
says James, " It must be admitted that, in certain persons
at least, the total possible consciousnesses may be split into
parts which coexist, but mutually ignore each other and
share the objects of knowledge between them, and—more
remarkable still—are complementary."
In Myers' opinion the formation of a secondary chain
of memory is the fundamental point in hypnosis and not
mere susceptibility to hypnosis. This chain of memory is
essential to the grouping of the various acts which manifest
the secondary consciousness. This classification excludes,
and I think justly so, some of the cases cited by Hyslop-
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Amnesia, even when associated with alterations in character,
does not constitute double consciousness. If it did the
bather who had forgotten the number of his machine and
lost his temper, might be described as a case of secondary
personality.
What are the exciting causes of the secondary and multiple
personalities ?
To this question no satisfactory answer has been given.
Shock, hysteria, &c, are said to be the origin of the
phenomena in Class I., but these terms explain nothing.
We know little of the essential conditions associated with
these morbid states, nor why they should produce a severing
of the personality in some instances and not in others.
Hypnotic conditions are induced by certain well-recog-
nised methods, but I can see no logical connection between
the acts of fixed gazing, concentration of attention, sug-
gested ideas of drowsy states, and the widely varying
phenomena of hypnosis. The latter do not appear sponta-
neously, and some of the methods described must have been
employed in every case before primary hypnosis was induced,
but I cannot conceive the idea that the methods explain the
phenomena.
At first, I considered cases of so-called multiple person-
alities—where these were hypnotic in origin—as simple
subdivisions of the ordinary hypnotic state, produced artifici-
ally by suggestion. The appearance of the phenomena of
appreciation and calculation of time in absolutely untrained
subjects—phenomena which the secondary consciousness
could not produce and of whose workings it was ignorant—
has caused me to modify this view:
The time appreciation of Savage and Hartog and the so-
called inspirations of genius—the results of mental work,
which come suddenly, as a finished product, into the primary
consciousness—are as difficult to explain, as the hypnotic
cases we have just been considering.
Multiple personalities, in relation to time appreciation
and calculation.
In the experiments cited, especially Miss A.'s, we noticed
(1) that the ordinary hypnotic consciousness possessed no
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recollection of having made the calculations necessary for
finding out the terminal time, and (2) could not recall any
form of time-watching. Further (3), the ordinary hypnotic
memory was incapable of retaining the complicated series of
suggestions; it remembered they had been made, but could
not recall their details. The results of the time appreciation
and calculation, presumably due to a third consciousness,
appeared as a sudden uprush into whatever personality—
waking, sleeping, or ordinary hypnotic—happened to be
present at the moment. When the ordinary hypnotic con-
sciousness had been asked to make the necessary calcula-
tions and did so erroneously, the third personality ignored
these mistakes and did its work correctly. Further, the
passage of the message from the third to the second person-
ality, seemed to make a particularly strong impression upon
the latter, or to leave, for some time at all events, the door
of communication open between the two. Thus the second
personality, which had forgotten the details of the sugges-
tions before these were carried out, could recall them accu-
rately a fortnight after they had been executed.
Granting that the third consciousness or personality per-
formed the feats in calculation and time appreciation, the
question still remains: "How was it able to do i t ? " It
matters little whether we regard the third personality as
really distinct, or as an artificial division of the secondary
one, we have still to solve the problems as to the nature and
origin of the powers of the hypnotic self, and particularly
their capacity for dealing with time appreciations and calcu-
lations, such as we have been considering.
THEORIES AS TO THE ORIGIN OF THE POWERS, OR
PHENOMENA, OF THE SECONDARY AND MULTIPLE SELVES.
Delbceuf's Theory.—According to Delboeuf, the various
animal functions which the human waking will is now
unable to influence, but which the hypnotic self can control,
were the revival of a power possessed by lower animal forms
—the remote ancestors of our race. These powers had
dropped out of the ordinary consciousness in the process of
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evolution, as their association with it had become unneces-
sary in the struggle for existence. Granting that a limited
analogy exists between lower animal types and hypnotised
subjects, as to their power of influencing certain physical
conditions, it would, I think, be impossible to establish an
analogy between the mental and moral capacities of the
latter and those of the savage or lower animal. The arith-
metical powers suddenly developed by Miss A. are not likely
to have been derived from some savage ancestor, who was
unable to count beyond five, or from some lower animal
presumably ignorant of arithmetic. Again, the same sub-
ject spontaneously solved, in hypnosis, a difficult problem in
dressmaking. The ability to correctly design a garment, in
accordance with the present fashion of the day, can hardly
have been derived from some woad-stained ancestor, or lower
animal form.
Hyslop's Theory.—Hyslop (" Double Consciousness,"
British Medical Journal, September 23, 1899), attempts to
explain the phenomena of double consciousness, by a
supposed inhibition of the amoeboid movements in the pseudo-
podic protoplasmic prolongations of the neurospongiuvi. As
the result of this, the connection between the nerve-cells is
interrupted, and the nerve currents which, under ordinary
circumstances, would pass freely from one to another, now
cease to do so. These physiological phenomena, he says, have
their psychical counterpart; the interruption of the nerve
currents, on the physical side, being represented, on the mental
one, by a breaking of the seriality of thought and a loss of
the elements, which go to make up consciousness and con-
sciousness of self. To this theory various objections might
be raised:—(1) The conditions which Hyslop would explain
by it—" the amnesic defects which," he says, " go so far
to constitute what we call double consciousness " are just
those conditions which are not characteristic of secondary
consciousness. It is true that some of the cases he cites, as
illustrating double consciousness, were practically character-
ised by amnesia alone, but these, as I pointed out, must be
excluded from, the category, as they lack that chain of
memory which is essential to the manifestation of double
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consciousness. Felida X., also cited by Hyslop as an
example of double consciousness, must be taken as the
characteristic and fully developed type of the condition we
are discussing. Here, the secondary self was not only
superior physically and mentally to the primary one, but it
also far surpassed it in memory. As time went on, the
primary self only appeared as occasional attacks of amnesia,
and thus, if it is essential to have a theory to explain
amnesic defects, it is those of the primary, and not of the
secondary self, which demand solution. Further, those very
amnesias of the primary consciousness form a part of the
memories of the secondary one. In Felida's case the
secondary personality ultimately gained a complete ascend-
ancy over the primary one, and, after a time, her periods of
normal life—rare of occurrence and short in duration—
appeared to her only as an illness, characterised by forgetful-
ness of events occurring in what was now, to her, her
normal existence. In this secondary state, there was
neither decrease of volition nor anything wanting of that
complete self which forms consciousness.
Hyslop, it is true, confines himself to instances of double
consciousness, associated with morbid conditions, but the
phenomena presented by Felida X., notably those of memory,
are closely analogous to those characteristic of the hypnotic
state, and his theory, if correct, should be equally applicable
to both conditions. Until recently, the mental states
involved in hypnosis have been little understood; the sub-
jects have been supposed to be automata, wanting in volition
and consciousness of self. The contrary, however, is the
case; volition and memory are increased in hypnosis, con-
sciousness of self is as vivid as in the normal state, and the
general intelligence is often improved. I t is these phe-
nomena which demand an explanation, not the suppositions
ones, which are based on mal-observations. Starting from
erroneous premises, many authorities have attempted to
explain the phenomena of hypnosis by an inhibition of
some form or another of mental activity, and Hyslop's
theory itself is simply a very old and well-known one
masquerading in a novel garb. Indeed, it was clearly
stated by John Hughes Bennett in 1851.
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Bennett's Physiological Theory.—According to Bennett,
hypnosis was characterised by alterations in the functional
activity of the nerve-tubes of the white matter of the
cerebral lobes. He suggested that a certain proportion of
these became paralysed through continuous monotonous
stimulation, while the action of others was consequently
exalted. As these tubes connect the cerebral ganglion cells,
suspension of their functions was assumed to bring with it
interruption of the connection between the ganglion cells.
Bennett's Psychical Theory.—From the psychical side
he explained the phenomena of hypnosis by the action of
predominant and unchecked ideas. These were able to
obtain prominence from the fact that other ideas, which
under ordinary circumstances would have controlled their
development, did not arise, because the portion of the brain
with which they were associated had its action temporarily
suspended, i.e., the connection between the ganglion cells
was broken, owing to the interrupted connection between
the fibres of association. Thus, he says, the remembrance
of a sensation can always be called up by the brain; but
under, ordinary circumstances, from the exercise of judgment,
comparison and other mental faculties, we know it is only
a remembrance. When these faculties are exhausted, the
suggested idea predominates, and the individual believes in
its reality. In this manner, we attribute to the faculties of
the mind, as a whole, a certain power of correcting the
fallacies, which each one of them is liable to fall into, in the
same way that the illusions of one sense are capable of being
detected by the healthy use of the other senses. There are
illusions mental and sensorial; the former caused by pre-
dominant ideas, and corrected by proper reasoning; the
latter caused by perversion of one sense, and corrected by
the right application of the others.
In hypnosis, then, according to this theory, a suggested
idea obtained prominence and created mental and sensorial
illusions, because the check action—the inhibitory power—
of certain higher centres had been temporarily suspended.
Bennett's theory, before it was finally enshrined by
Hyslop in charmingly simple scientific phrase, had prac-
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tically served the turn of all those who regarded the hypnotic
personality as a limited or degraded form of the normal one.
Thus, according to Heidenhain, the phenomena of hypnotism
owed their origin to the arrested activity of the ganglion
cells of the cerebral cortex. Because these were inhibited,
sensory impressions, which usually produced movements,
after passing to the higher centres and evoking conscious-
ness, now did so by passing directly to the motor centres.
This theory was accepted by Professor McKendrick, of
Glasgow, and restated by him in the last edition of the
"Encyclopaedia Britannica," as giving a true and scientific
explanation of the phenomena of so-called animal magnetism.
Many objections have been successfully raised to this theory,
while the supposed facts upon which it is based have been
amply demonstrated to be without foundation.
Heidenhain simply reproduces the physical side of
Bennett's theory, while Bernheim, although he denies all
physiological change in hypnosis, faithfully reproduces the
corresponding psychical one.
Bennett's theory crops up again in Vincent's " Hypno-
tism." Thirty-two pages are devoted to "neurons" and
"dendrons," " inapt ic" and " aptic " acts and reasons for
rejecting the term "reflex." Finally we arrive at the
hypnotic theory, which is founded simply on an inhibition
of one set of functions—with an increased capacity of action
in the others—the inhibition and dynamogeny of Brown-
Sequard. " The stimulus," Vincent says, " instead of being
dissipated amongst an indefinite number of neuronic groups,
is confined to those whose function is the pure appreciation
of the stimulus; the other groups, whose function is the
consideration of the reasonableness of the suggestion, and
the development of the stimulus in other conscious directions,
are inhibited."
Sidis, in the " Psychology of Suggestion," explains the
phenomena of hypnosis in exactly the same way. " There
is," he says, " a functional dissociation between the nerve
cells. The association fibres that connect groups into
systems, communities, clusters, constellations—contract.
The fine processes of the nerve cells, the dendrons, or the
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termination, arborisation, or the collaterals that touch these
dendrons, thus forming the elementary group—retract and
cease to come into contact." He further discusses which
association fibres give way first, and whether the neuraxon
is contracted as a whole or whether the fibrillse alone
contract and so withdraw the terminal arborisations for
minute distances. All this might be of interest if it were
related in anyway to the subject in dispute. The phenomena
to be explained, however—increased memory, intelligence,
&c.—are just the exact opposite of those which have been
assumed, and theories, no matter how elaborate, nor how
learned in terminology, are valueless when founded upon
imaginary mental states, the existence of which is simply
assumed by the operator. What does it matter whether
lack of consciousness or loss of memory be produced by
interruption of association fibres, arrested action of ganglionic
cells of the cerebral cortex, retracted dendrons or discon-
nected neurons, or even by an inhibition of the amoeboid
movements in the pseudopodic protoplasmic prolongations of
the neurospongium, if the problems we are dealing with are
actually an increase of intelligence, consciousness, volition
and memory ?
Janet's Theory.—According to Pierre Janet, the secondary
self is always a symptom of hysteria, while the essential
fact about hysteria is its lack of synthetising power, and
the consequent disintegration of the field of consciousness
into mutually exclusive parts. Further, the secondary and
primary consciousness added together never exceed the
normally total consciousnesses of the individual.
Here the generalisation is certainly far too wide. Doubt-
less many cases of secondary consciousness correspond
with Janet's description, others, however, present condi-
tions which are its exact opposite. Thus, while hysteria
is a prominent symptom in cases of spontaneous secondary
consciousness, it is, on the other hand, not necessarily
connected in any way with hypnotic form. Thousands of
healthy men, absolutely devoid of any trace of hysteria,
have been hypnotised, while hysteria itself, instead of
favouring the induction of hypnosis, renders it more
difficult.
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Further, as to the relation between the severed per-
sonalities and the normal total consciousnesses, James justly
points out that many instances have been noted, in which
the secondary self is more highly developed than the primary
one. It knows, for example, all that the ordinary self ever
knew, and also much that the other had forgotten, or never
known. Dr. Prince's case is a typical example of- this.
Here, the third personality not only knew all about her own
life and that of the secondary personality, but also could
recall (a) all that the normal personality could remember,
and further (b) many things that the primary personality
had known but forgotten, and (c) acts which the normal
self had performed automatically, or absent-mindedly, and
which had only reached normal consciousness partially, if
at all; (d) finally, the third personality recalled events which
had occurred in the delirium of fever, things of which the
primary self was absolutely ignorant, and indeed had never
known.
None of the theories we have been examining can be
considered satisfactory. No revival of powers supposed to
be possessed by lower animal forms can possibly explain
the entire range of hypnotic phenomena; neither, again,
can they be accounted for by an interrupted connection
between the nerve cells, nor by that elastic term hysteria.
Gurney's theory that the secondary consciousness calculates
and watches the time, just as the primary one might do, is
satisfactory for those instances in which it has been proved
that this has occurred. It fails, however, when we attempt
to apply it to those in which the facts were absent, and in
which the feats in calculation and time appreciation were
beyond the powers of the secondary self.
As the secondary self is often intellectually superior to
the primary one, though we don't know why, we might be
inclined to admit, although equally without reason for it,
that the third self transcends the second one. As all the
selves inhabit one body, and as the secondary and tertiary
ones have presumably access to all the information which
reaches the primary, are we to suppose that they have
proved the apter scholars ? It seems more than fanciful
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to imagine that while the schoolboy's ordinary self was
learning his lessons, a second boy was peering over his
shoulder, as it were, and doing the work still better. What
must we say, however, to the idea of a third boy learning
along with Nos. 1 and 2, and surpassing both of them ?
The examples, of time appreciation, we have been con-
sidering, present problems still more difficult. As we have
seen, there is a marked difference between knowing a par-
ticular day on its arrival, and recognising which is the ter-
minal one amongst a long series of minutes. For example,
suppose that a suggestion to be fulfilled in 20,840 minutes
fell due at 3.15 on a certain afternoon, and that from
12.20 p;m. of the same day the subject of it remained in a
room, where she was deprived of all ordinary means of
determining the passage of time. Granting that the sub-
ject's third personality had calculated 3.15 as the terminal
time, that she had noted the time on entering the room and
calculated that 3 hours and 55 minutes had to expire before
the suggestion was due, and even admitting that she was
able to impart this information to her primary consciousness,
and to enlist its aid in her attempt to hit upon the exact
moment, viz., 3.15, the question still remains, how was this
done?
According to William James, our usual time apprecia-
tions—minutes, hours and days—have to be conceived sym-
bolically and constructed by successive mental additions.
To realise an hour, we must count " now ! " " now ! "
" now ! " indefinitely. Each " now " is the feeling of a
separate bit of time, and the exact sum of the bits never
makes a very clear impression on our minds. We have no
sense for empty time and have to subdivide the time by
noticing the sensations; after we have received a certain
number, our impression of the amount told off becomes
quite vague, and our only way of knowing it accurately is by
counting, noticing the clock, or some other symbolical con-
ception. Our estimation of the length of time varies from
many causes. A time full of interesting experiences seems
short in passing, but long when looked back upon; time
empty of incident is long in passing, but seems short in
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retrospect. Time passes quickly when we are so occupied
with what is happening as not to notice the time itself.
When we do nothing and feel little we grow more and more
attentive to the passage of time. The length of a watched
minute seems incredible, because the attention is devoted to
the feeling of the time itself, such attention being capable of
extremely fine subdivision.
In conclusion James says, "We are constantly conscious
of a certain duration—-the spacious present — varying in
length from a few seconds to probably not more than a
minute, and that this duration (with its content perceived
as having one part earlier and the other later) is the original
intuition of time. Longer times are conceived by adding,
shorter ones by dividing, portions of the vaguely bounded
unit, and are habitually thought by us symbolically. Kant's
notion of intuition of objective time as an infinite necessary
continuum has nothing to support it. The cause of the
intuition, which we really have, cannot be the duration of
our brain processes or our mental changes. That duration
is rather the object of the intuition which, being realised at
every moment of such duration, must be due to a per-
manently present cause. This cause—probably the simul-
taneous presence of brain processes of different phase—
fluctuates ; and, hence, a certain range of variation in the
amount of the intuition and its subdivisibility accrues."
Further, " the direct intuition of time is limited to inter-
vals of considerably less than a minute. Beyond its borders
extends the immense region of conceived time, past and
future, into one direction or another of which we mentally
project all the events which we think of as real, and form a
systematic order of them by giving to each a date."
If we accept James' explanation as to the methods by
which time appreciations are carried out—and I know of no
other more plausible—the time appreciations of Miss A.
seem still more remarkable and inexplicable.
While I have endeavoured to show that the theories as
to the origin of secondary and multiple personalities—both
as to the states themselves and their phenomena—are en-
tirely inadequate, I have no theory of my own to bring
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forward in substitution for these. The fresh facts I have
cited, although interesting, only add to the complexity of
the problems we have to solve. As William James truly
says, these manifestations of the "hidden self" are im-
mensely complex and fluctuating things, which, we have
hardly begun to understand and concerning which sweeping
generalisation is sure to be premature. Meanwhile, he adds,
a comparative study of subconscious states is of the most
urgent importance for the comprehension of our nature.
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